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1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to our research work. Here we first discuss the 
motivation for our research following which the objectives, scope and research 
questions are described. After that we discuss the used research methodology, and 
finally structure of the thesis is outlined. 
1.1 Motivation 
Widespread adoption of smartphones, tablets and other smart devices has resulted in 
mobile operators (MOs) making a transition from voice to data centric business model. 
As a consequence there has been an increase in demand for radio spectrum and 
managing spectrum is becoming increasingly difficult for regulatory agencies. Recent 
studies conducted by Cisco (2010), Cisco (2011) show an exponentially increasing 
demand for mobile data and requirements for higher data rates. According to Valletti 
(2001) there is a general consensus within the research community that spectrum 
availability in the future can be a cause of concern, the main reason of which is being 
attributed to the traditional and inflexible approach (i.e. command and control) towards 
spectrum management. Under this approach regulatory bodies specify details pertaining 
to allowed use of spectrum, technologies which are permitted to be used, bandwidth 
limits, and transmitter parameters etc. According to Caicedo & Weiss (2011) command 
and control method of spectrum management primarily focuses on avoiding interference 
between users and on the type of use given to spectrum rather than on efficient use of 
spectrum. This argument is further supported by experimental studies conducted by 
Islam et al. (2008), Renk et al. (2008), McHenry (2005) identifying the presence of un-
utilized and under-utilized portions of spectrum on spatial and temporal basis. 
In order to meet the growing demands for spectrum typically two primarily solutions 
have been suggested – one is to improve the spectral efficiency of wireless technology 
and the other is to improve spectrum utilization levels by overhauling the existing 
spectrum management techniques. In this research work we focus on latter of the two 
proposed solutions considering that all the technological advances to improve spectral 
efficiency might not be able to keep pace with growing spectrum demand and thus in 
that case it is necessary to develop technical, business and regulatory frameworks for 
more effective spectrum management.  
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Some of the new models based on the principle of higher spectrum utilization are 
explored in Peha (1998), Peha & Panichpapiboon (2004), Faulhaber (2005), Peha 
(2005), Weiss & Lehr (2009). One common theme emerging from all these research 
work is that even though the quantity of available spectrum is fixed, the available 
supply could however be significantly expanded by dynamically sharing (as in Dynamic 
Spectrum Access (DSA)) the spectrum and hence supporting the secondary usage of 
spectrum.  According to Olafsson et al. (2007) the core problem of spectrum 
inflexibility is the close coupling between the three elements of „spectrum‟, „ownership‟ 
and „applications‟. As a result one finds wireless services segregated into distinct and 
well defined value chain silos. According to Chapin & Lehr (2007) DSA facilitating 
novel business models and wireless architecture is the way forward to achieve higher 
levels of spectrum utilization and break these silos; in-turn altering the existing value 
chains and migrating towards converged future wireless services which is going to be 
beneficial for consumer, competition and innovation within wireless industry. 
1.2 Objective, scope and research questions 
The objective of our research is to design and analyze market mechanisms facilitating 
secondary spectrum usage across heterogeneous set of market players involving both 
wide area (WA) and local area (LA) operators. As a sub-objective we focus on creating 
a ‘win-win’ scenario i.e. economically favourable conditions for sharing of spectrum 
among the users, across wireless network infrastructure and access right regimes. Win-
win is considered important so that it provides incentives for the primary users to share 
spectrum with potential secondary users or else the potentially losing spectrum owners 
have many powerful means to slow down the evolution towards increasing spectrum 
dynamics. 
Our work is an effort to extend the span of existing research work which assumes a 
clean slate approach and primarily concentrates on spectrum trading (ST) in between 
homogeneous wireless service providers as done in Caicedo & Weiss (2011), Peha & 
Panichpapiboon (2004).The novelty of our work lies in the fact that we are building a 
market involving heterogeneous players by taking incremental steps towards it. We 
evaluate the designed mechanism, the results of which are expected to provide inputs 
for deciding on technical, economic and regulatory frameworks required to 
institutionalize spectrum trading markets as a tool for future spectrum management.  
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The research on secondary usage of spectrum requires substantial knowledge of both 
the underlying technology models as well as the economics and business models. We do 
our research with an assumption that the required technology exists (i.e. technical 
details are beyond the scope of this research) and thus focus primarily on the economic 
and business models around the secondary usage of spectrum. 
Having discussed the objectives and scope of our research we now state the research 
questions which guide the course of our research work. Following are the research 
questions which we primarily focus on: 
 What is state of the art literature on secondary spectrum usage? 
 Which of the future spectrum management models being discussed in 
research literature fits in our objective of designing a ‘win-win’ 
market mechanism? 
 What are the key features to design a practical and readily implementable 
market mechanism facilitating secondary spectrum trading? 
 What incremental steps will happen in the evolution process towards 
the secondary spectrum trading markets?  
 Under which conditions and assumptions is the co-existence of multiple 
secondary users and systems within the proposed market mechanism 
economically favorable for all? 
 What impact does introduction of trading markets have on volume of 
traffic flowing through network of different operators? 
 What impact does the length of lease time have on realizing a 
successful ST market scenario? 
 Which of the two strategies – local area or wide area, seems to offer 
more benefits when adopted for usage of TVWS spectrum? 
1.3 Research Methodology 
For this work we use a three step approach towards research methodology. At the first 
step a state-of-the-art review is conducted (aided by research literature and semi-
structured interview of industry experts) to illustrate important features of future 
spectrum management models, Wi-Fi offloading systems, Television White Spaces 
(TVWS) spectrum opportunities, technologies enabling future spectrum management 
models (specifically database system), and finally a review on various facets of 
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spectrum trading market. This is expected to provide inputs for designing our market 
mechanism and evaluation procedures. 
As a next step we have used an incremental approach which forms the central element 
contributing towards the design of market mechanism for secondary usage of radio 
spectrum. We have used Value Network Configuration (VNC) methodology adopted 
from Casey et al. (2010) for illustrating the design of market mechanism.  Under VNC, 
participating market actors take on specific roles (aided by their technical components) 
and establish business interfaces amongst each other.  
The designed market mechanism reflects an evolutionary approach and all the steps 
involved in it are such that they build upon the previous step. Finally, we considered 
different strategies for evaluating our design. After gauging specific requirements of our 
market mechanism we decided to go forward with Agent Based Modeling (ABM) 
(Macal & North (2010)) which is particularly suitable for modeling complex systems 
involving a number of interacting entities which are referred to as the agents. The 
fundamental feature of an agent is its capability to make independent decision based on 
pre-defined behavior. There are a number of open source toolkits available for the 
purpose of ABM and within these toolkit agents are represented as software entities. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured as followed: In chapter 2 we present the state-of the-art review 
on all those subjects which are relevant to understand and shape the future of spectrum 
management. The findings of this chapter provide insights to design our market 
mechanism for secondary usage of spectrum. In chapter 3 we illustrate the fine details 
of the value network design of our market mechanism. Here we also discuss the setting 
up of agent based model used (i.e. model assumptions and configuration) for simulating 
different trading instances as part of our market mechanism. Chapter 4 is dedicated for 
analyzing the simulation results where we evaluate different cases across certain 
specified performance metrics. Finally, in chapter 5 we draw conclusions by reviewing 
how effectively we were able to meet the objectives of this research work, discuss our 
contributions and suggest directions for future work. 
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2. State-of-the-art review 
This chapter provides the necessary background information for the research.  Here we 
first discuss the different spectrum management frameworks existing in the research 
literature with an objective to identify the ones best suited for our design of win-win 
market mechanism. Following that we review Wi-Fi offloading systems as one possible 
solution for mobile operators (MOs) to ease congestion in their networks and meet the 
exponentially growing data demands of their subscriber. After that we explore what 
opportunities Television White Spaces (TVWS) band of spectrum has on offer (in terms 
of the amount of spectrum, deployment of different wireless technologies, potential use 
cases etc.) to mitigate the growing concerns of spectrum scarcity.  
Next we review the technologies which are expected to be key enablers of future 
spectrum management techniques with a specific emphasis on database systems as it is 
being considered an important component within systems working on the principle of 
DSA. Finally, we review the literature concerning spectrum trading markets covering 
motivation and challenges to implement such markets, different trading mechanisms 
and methodology adopted for simulating and evaluating these markets. 
2.1 Spectrum management tools 
Traditionally command and control approach has been used for managing the spectrum 
which is based on static spectrum allocation model Olafsson et al. (2007). Considering 
the legacy mobile networks, such an approach has been vital for large scale diffusion, 
harmonization and standardization process for various radio access technologies, for 
e.g. – GSM. However Tonmukayakul & Weiss (2004) says that it is important to 
understand that radio spectrum is a multi dimensional (space, time and frequency) entity 
where command and control approach leads to a barrier in accessing these various 
dimensions. Legacy spectrum management tools do not factor in the importance of 
spectrum utilization and with rising concerns about spectrum crunch, they are going to 
hamper the development of new and innovative wireless services. Hence there is a 
requirement for alternative spectrum management models which would allow a more 
efficient and flexible utilization of spectrum in future. Dynamic Spectrum Management 
(DSM) can break the above mentioned barriers in one or more of the dimensions. 
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With a possibility of spectrum crunch in future, a considerable amount of research has 
been done to identify alternative spectrum management models which would allow a 
more efficient and flexible utilization of spectrum. These research works discuss 
various facets of spectrum management on technical, economical and regulatory fronts. 
Here we try to classify these numerous studies so as to reveal the state-of-the-art of 
future spectrum management models. This will provide a better understanding of the 
tools required to manage spectrum efficiently, give an overview of the solutions 
proposed in the current literature, and more importantly will help in identifying the gaps 
to be filled in future studies. It also does provide inputs for designing our win-win 
spectrum management framework.  
Nekovee (2006) has identified three distinct models for spectrum management:  
 The license-exempt model (open spectrum) 
 Secondary usage of the licensed spectrum  
 The market model 
According to Chapin & Lehr (2007) it is important to identify those spectrum 
management models which are going to fuel-in the initial commercialization of CR and 
DSA technologies. A ‘win-win’ business model where all the participating market 
players have incentives to contribute and promote realization of such technologies could 
be one possible way of moving ahead. Table 2-1 categorizes different spectrum 
management models proposed in research literature having similar characteristics under 
three models as proposed by Nekovee (2006) and identifies those which fall in ‘win-
win’ category. This would help in better understanding of numerous complementary 
spectrum management models currently existing in literature. In the following sub-
section we discuss each of these models in detail.   
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Table 2-1 Categorization of different spectrum management models 
Spectrum Model Complementary Models Comments 
License-exempt 
(open spectrum) 
- Public commons (Niyato & Hossain 
(2008)) 
- Open Approach (Hwang & Yoon 
(2009)) 
- Spectrum Commons  Coexistence 
Cooperation (Peha (2007)) 
- Does not represent a win-win 
scenario 
Secondary usage of 
licensed spectrum 
- Private commons (Niyato & 
Hossain (2008)) 
- Commons Approach (spectrum 
sharing) (Hwang & Yoon (2009)) 
- Primary-secondary sharing with 
coexistence (Peha (2007)) 
- Transmission according to 
underlay or overlay approach 
(Niyato & Hossain (2008)) 
- win-win if revenue sharing 
mechanism otherwise not 
Market Model - Property rights approach (Peha 
(2007)) 
- Exclusive usage model (Niyato & 
Hossain (2008)) 
- Primary-secondary sharing based 
on cooperation (Peha (2007)) 
- real time or non real time ST 
markets (Attar et al. (2008)) 
- a win-win scenario 
 
2.1.1 The license-exempt model (open spectrum model) 
The first proposed approach of managing spectrum in future is to adopt a model which 
Nekovee (2006) refer to as the license-exempt (open spectrum). License exempt usage 
could be of two types – dedicated unlicensed (explained in this sub-section) and the 
other which is a relatively newer concept involving unlicensed on secondary usage basis 
(discussed in next sub-section). 
This model has also been referred to as the as „Public commons model‟ in Niyato & 
Hossain (2008) , „Open Approach‟ in Hwang & Yoon (2009) and „Spectrum Commons 
based on coexistence‟ in Peha (2007). According to these models the radio spectrum 
must be made open to anyone for access with equal rights under a minimum set of 
restrictions called spectrum etiquette as defined by standardization bodies, regulators or 
industry players. Researchers advocating this approach argue that unlicensed use of 
spectrum would play a crucial role in supporting innovation process and in maximizing 
the benefits from advancements in mobile communication.  
This spectrum management framework has been successfully applied to 2.4-2.483GHz, 
5.725-5.78GHz ISM (Industrial, Scientific and Medical) band where the wireless 
standards such as IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), cordless phones and Bluetooth co-exist. The 
Wi-Fi standards have been widely adopted, as best demonstrated by the rise of WLANs 
(Wireless Local Area Network) and have spurred tremendous innovation and 
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productivity. Despite the considerable interference in these bands, WLAN presents the 
most popular and successful wireless access to internet today. Large scale roll-outs of 
wireless APs (Access Point) based on IEEE 802.11 protocols are planned and have in 
some cases already been undertaken. The success of WLANs, in spite of intensively 
used spectrum and considerable interference, provides strong support for the case of 
making unregulated spectrum available for wireless access (Olafsson et al. (2007)). All 
above mentioned variants find a close synergy between them; however Peha (2007) 
further classifies the Spectrum commons model based upon the cooperation strategies. 
In this commons model all devices cooperate and there is a requirement that all devices 
must share a detailed communications protocol. 
2.1.2 Secondary usage of the licensed spectrum 
As an alternative for future spectrum management, Private commons model (Niyato & 
Hossain (2008)) is very popular. This particular spectrum management framework has 
been referred to as Commons Approach (spectrum sharing) in Hwang & Yoon (2009) 
and Primary - Secondary sharing with coexistence strategy in Peha (2007).  This model 
is based upon secondary usage of the licensed spectrum and its key enablers include 
innovative sensing technologies, cognitive radio (CR) networks, global positioning 
systems (GPS) and Software defined radio (SDR).We discuss in detail about these 
enabling technologies in following sections.  
One of the operators has primary usage rights (the one who has been assigned an 
exclusive license for a spectrum band) which guarantees the required quality of service 
(QoS) for its subscribers, and there exist one or more secondary systems operating 
together. In principle secondary users should operate without causing any harmful 
interference to the primary. The secondary users facilitated by technologies mentioned 
above identify sections of idle spectrum in the licensed frequency bands and then 
transmit over these bands by either adopting an underlay or an overlay approach.  
In the underlay approach a secondary user spreads the transmission over a large 
bandwidth using low transmission power (e.g., ultra-wideband [UWB] 
transmission).The idea here is that secondary devices transmit at such low power that 
they never cause interference and essentially are invisible to the primary system.  
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In the overlay approach a secondary user access the spectrum in the frequency or time 
domain and transmit opportunistically only after sensing the environment and ensuring 
that transmissions do not cause harmful interference. Here secondary user's access 
rights are overlaid on top of the primary user so as to exploit opportunities when the 
primary user is not actually utilizing the spectrum. While power control is crucial for 
underlay access, spectrum opportunity identification and synchronization are important 
for overlay access (Niyato & Hossain (2008)).    
The model further split into two branches depending upon the nature of secondary users 
– unlicensed or licensed. In case of unlicensed secondary users the QoS need not be 
guaranteed as there can be many other unlicensed secondary users transmitting in the 
same spectrum region, which is difficult to sense and manage. One of the examples 
falling in this category is that of unlicensed reuse of TV broadcast channels (TV white 
spaces) by CRs. A number of standardization activities are being carried out by IEEE 
(Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers) working groups in order to exploit 
the TVWS potential and ensure a commercially viable use case. Some of these activities 
include IEEE 802.11af Super Wi-Fi, IEEE 802.22 Wireless Rural Area Network 
(WRAN) and IEEE 802.19.1 coexistence of TVWS devices. We discuss about these 
standardization activities in detail within TVWS section. 
In the case of licensed secondary spectrum users there is a possibility of assuring QoS 
as the secondary system need not be concerned about interference from other secondary 
users. They still need to follow certain spectrum etiquette so as to avoid causing 
harmful interference to primary users. Mobile operators can be given an exclusive 
access to transmit opportunistically in TV white spaces or guard bands thus presenting 
an example of licensed secondary users operating with a primary system in a non-
coordinated opportunistic manner. As shown above, a number of primary-secondary 
arrangements are possible which are going to become more practical with regulatory 
reforms supported by technological advancements.  
2.1.3 The market model 
Finally we explore the market based model which has been referred to as the Property-
rights approach in Hwang & Yoon (2009), Exclusive usage model in Niyato & Hossain 
(2008) and Primary-secondary sharing based on co-operation in Peha (2007). Attar et al. 
(2008) further classifies such kind of markets being real-time and non real-time ST 
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markets. As within the current spectrum assignment process, in order to protect 
spectrum users against the interference, licenses are granted with exclusive rights. 
However within this new model, licensee gets a right to further sell or lease its spectrum 
usage rights to other market players. As a result of which the spectrum could be 
reallocated from low-value users to high-value users. Spectrum trading interaction 
ensures that this model is going to be based upon cooperation where selling or leasing 
of spectrum usage rights is analogous to that of secondary user taking permission before 
transmitting from primary user.  
Such kind of mechanism would ensure that primary users make profits out of their 
otherwise un-utilized or underutilized portions of spectrum while secondary users could 
have an access to new spectrum with a guaranteed QoS. Other potential gains includes 
more efficient companies displacing inefficient ones and expanding; and new 
companies getting an access to spectrum to enter new and existing markets (Chapin & 
Lehr (2007)), thereby increasing competition and technological developments. However 
for such ST markets to succeed we need to analyze and decide on various matters such 
as nature of market settings and players (homogeneous or heterogeneous), optimum 
lease times, defining tradable usage rights and overcoming other potential inefficiencies 
and challenges. We discuss more details on ST markets later in a section primarily 
focusing on it. 
2.1.4 Dynamic spectrum access: taxonomy 
IEEE P1900.1 working group (IEEE P1900 WG (2006)) has defined Dynamic 
Spectrum Access (DSA) as “technique by which a radio (system) dynamically adapts to 
select operating spectrum to use available (in local time-frequency space) spectrum 
holes with limited spectrum rights”. According to Nekovee (2006) DSA is one of the 
more developed forms of CR technology. DSA also take place in several forms and has 
its two main branches as cooperative and non-cooperative. The form of DSA network 
architecture required varies accordingly. Nekovee (2006) discuss different architectures 
associated with DSA and classifies them broadly under centralized, decentralized, and 
fully autonomous categories. Niyato & Hossain (2008) further argues that the used DSA 
protocol depend on the nature of interaction (i.e. either cooperative or non-cooperative) 
between the CR entities. Next we discuss the requirements of different architecture of 
DSA in more detail. 
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I. Centralized approach to cooperative DSA – This approach requires a 
centralized control entity to gather all the information on spectrum availability 
from primary users (supply side) and spectrum requirements from secondary 
users (demand side). The centralized entity further matches the demand and 
supply side. Spectrum is assigned in an optimal manner such that it maximizes 
the revenue of a primary service provider and/or utility of secondary users. Such 
kind of DSA architecture would be required in spectrum trading markets where 
the role of centralized control entity would be taken by the spectrum exchange 
facilitated by brokers and auctioneers.  
II. Centralized approach to non-cooperative DSA - In such a system there exist a 
centralized CR controller and a number of CR devices with spectrum sensing 
capabilities. The CR devices continuously perform spectral measurements and 
report it back to the CR controller signaling the presence, if any, of primary 
users. The centralized controller thus has complete network information. It uses 
the reported signals from CR devices and also its own measurements to achieve 
a reliable detection and prediction of idle spectrum. An example of such 
architecture has been described in Weiss & Jondral (2004). 
III. Decentralized & autonomous approach to non-cooperative DSA –This 
architecture is based on the sensing techniques of the CR entities which have 
their independent objectives and do not collaborate with each other which may 
result into a hidden node problem. A CR device senses the spectrum it wishes to 
use and determine the presence of primary users and other CR devices. Based on 
the sensing information, the device identifies spectrum opportunities (frequency, 
time, space, and code), and transmits in a manner such that it does not cause 
interference to the primary users and limit it to other CR devices through 
defined spectrum etiquettes. Most notable example of this approach is the 
DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) next generation program 
in the USA (Horne (2003)).  
IV. Decentralized approach to cooperative DSA – In this architecture there is no 
centralized controller and instead all the CR entities form a localized group to 
pool in their sensing information. These groups of CR collaborate with each 
other, both in identification of spectrum opportunities and in utilization of these 
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spectrum resources. There is a drawback associated with this approach 
concerning the communication overhead which is caused by frequent exchange 
of coordination and control messages between the CR devices. 
2.2 Mobile data offloading to WLAN systems 
Rapid consumer uptake of smartphones, cellular-enabled tablets and netbooks has 
resulted in an upsurge of mobile data usage. The result of which is that the mobile 
operators are facing a challenge to explore other avenues of meeting this increase in 
demand for data which is overtaking most of their cellular network capacity. Wi-Fi 
offloading can be one possible solution to these challenges. According to 
Balasubramanian et al. (2010), Doufexi et al. (2003) with high capacity and low 
implementation cost Wi-Fi is an ideal technology for expanding cellular data capability.  
There is a ubiquitous excess Wi-Fi capacity available in dense urban areas which could 
be used by mobile operators to relax the data congestion in their own networks. Thus 
the strength of Wi-Fi solutions will be in the existing capacity on offer through WLAN 
systems deployed in public places, community networks and individual households. The 
challenging task from an operator point of view is to get an access to this fragmented 
Wi-Fi capacity in a managed and secured way which requires an interworking and 
integration solution in between 3GPP (3
rd
 Generation Partnership Project) technologies 
and WLAN systems. Several WLAN standardization organizations (in particular ETSI, 
IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15) have agreed to set up a joint wireless interworking group 
(WIG) to deal with the interworking between WLANs and cellular networks. This 
section discusses about the initiatives taken by 3GPP to develop a cellular-WLAN 
interworking architecture as an add-on to the 3GPP cellular system specification. Later 
in this section we also discuss some of the existing business models and solutions 
centered on Wi-Fi offloading. 
2.2.1 Interworking architecture between 3GPP and WLAN systems 
WLANs can cover only a small area and allow limited mobility, but provide higher data 
rates. Therefore, WLANs are well suited to hotspot coverage where there is a high 
density of demand for high data-rate wireless services requiring limited mobility. On 
the other hand, 3G wireless networks, with their well-established wide coverage, and 
high mobility, are more suited to areas with moderate or low-density demand for 
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wireless usage requiring high mobility. Therefore, WLANs and 3G can be seen as 
complementary. 
The integration of 3G wireless and WLANs is highly significant to make wireless 
multimedia and other high data-rate services possible for a large population. A 
multimedia 3G/WLAN terminal can access high-bandwidth data services where WLAN 
coverage is offered, while accessing wide area networks using 3G at other places.  
According to Garg (2007) the primary interworking objectives and requirements are as 
followed: 
 Common billing and customer care. This is the simplest form of interworking 
that provides a common bill and customer care to the subscriber but otherwise 
requires no real interworking between the WLAN and 3GPP data networks. 
 3GPP-based access control and charging. This requires authentication, 
authorization, and accounting (AAA)
1
 for subscribers in the WLAN to be based 
on the same AAA procedures used in the 3GPP data networks. It means a 
mobile subscriber can use his or her subscriber identity module (SIM) to access 
WLAN services.  
 Access to 3GPP-based packet switched services. The aim of this requirement is 
to allow the mobile operator to allow access to its 3GPP data services to 
subscribers in a WLAN environment. It means a mobile subscriber should be 
able to access/select 3GPP data services through the WLAN access network.  
 Service continuity. The goal is to allow seamless service continuity across the 
3GPP and WLAN systems. It means that a user session during mobility across 
these networks should not only continue but also should not have noticeable 
service change in terms of quality and disruption. 
 Access to 3GPP circuit-switched services. The goal of this requirement is to 
allow the 3GPP operator to offer access to circuit-switched services such as 
voice calls from the WLAN systems. 
ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) has specified two generic 
approaches for interworking – tight coupling and loose coupling. With tight coupling 
                                                          
1
 Cisco has developed an innovative next-generation hotspot strategy based on IEEE 802.11u, Wi-Fi 
Protected Access 2 (WPA2)-Enterprise and standards-based Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) 
methods which enable MOs to offload data traffic securely to Wi-Fi (Cisco (2011)) 
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the WLAN is connected to the 3GPP core network in the same way as any other radio 
access network. In this case, the WLAN data traffic goes through the 3GPP core 
network before reaching the external packet data networks. Thus in this architecture 
Wi-Fi provides an alternate radio access for standard 3G RAN. In 3GPP release this 
kind of architecture is called as Enhanced Generic Access Network (EGAN) 
architecture. The following figure taken from Gunasekaran & Harmantzis (2008) 
illustrates the tight coupling interworking architecture. 
 
Figure 2-1 Tight coupling interworking architecture between 3GPP and WLAN as described in 
Gunasekaran & Harmantzis (2008) 
In case of loosely coupled architecture the WLAN is integrated with the 3GPP network 
in the operators IP network, thus in contrast to tight coupling, the WLAN data traffic 
does not pass through the 3GPP core network but goes directly to the operator‟s IP 
network. This approach is called Interworking Wireless LAN (IWLAN) architecture. 
The following figure illustrates the loose coupling interworking architecture. 
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Figure 2-2 Loose coupling interworking architecture between 3GPP and WLAN as described in 
Gunasekaran & Harmantzis (2008) 
 
2.2.2 Existing models centered around Wi-Fi offloading 
In this sub-section we discuss some of the existing Wi-Fi offloading business models 
and solutions which have been developed for MOs to take advantage of unlicensed 
spectrum and form Wi-Fi as part of their strategy. We describe about the commercial 
offloading solutions on offer by WeFi
2
 and Notava
3
. 
WeFi  
WeFi have developed ANSDF (Access Network Discovery and Selected Function) 
technology which is 3GPP compliant and integrates with MO‟s core network enabling 
them to monitor, control and analyze the mobile device's connectivity behavior. The 
WefiANSDF system consists of three parts: a software client for consumer‟s mobile 
device, a global database of Wi-Fi networks (build upon by the community efforts) and 
control panel that operators can use for specifying when and where devices on their 
network should offload. It is also possible for MOs to maintain QoS by monitoring the 
performance characteristics of access points through information gathered from all the 
users.  
                                                          
2
 http://www.wefi.com 
3
 http://www.notava.com 
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Notava 
Notava is a Wi-Fi offloading company providing QoS aware offloading solutions 
enabling MOs to manage their own and also third party WiFi networks.  Their product 
uAxes integrates with MO‟s core network and provides them control on their 
subscribers over network selection. On the mobile device it is required to have uAxes 
connectivity client and connection manager. uAxes provides SIM based user 
authentication and efficient integration to operators charging and billing system as well. 
2.3 Television white space spectrum opportunities 
According to Olafsson et al. (2007) the spectrum that is currently being targeted for the 
initial commercialization of DSA-based, CR-enabled radio systems for secondary use, 
sharing is the TV White Space spectrum.  FCC in US and Ofcom in UK have allocated 
TVWS for unlicensed use allowing the operation of cognitive devices on license-
exempt basis. The efforts towards quantifying the availability and variability of TVWS 
spectrum reveal that the total capacity associated with it is quite significant. Adding on 
to that the wide-area coverage ability of TV frequencies (as signals in TV bands travel 
much further in a cluttered environment compared to in frequency bands dedicated for 
Wi-Fi and 3GPP technologies) and better penetration into buildings with much lower 
loss, TVWS becomes an attractive spectrum band to operate.    
TV broadcasters are the incumbent license holders
4
 of the spectrum band in concern and 
their cooperation is going to be central towards a successful secondary usage of TVWS. 
Thus in order to make sure that TV broadcasters feel motivated to co-operate, it is 
important that market mechanism must be such that they are also compensated in one 
way or the other as the operation of a cognitive secondary device in TVWS does create 
some kind of interference for TV broadcasting operations.  
2.3.1 Origin of TV White Spaces 
TV broadcasters have the license to operate in the Very High Frequency (VHF) and 
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) portions of the radio spectrum. Over the years the 
broadcasters have used the analogue transmission methods for their television services. 
                                                          
4
 This may not hold true for some of the market places where the broadcasters have a license to transmit 
only in certain places. 
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However in recent years the advent of digital transmission has proven to provide better 
user experience and higher spectral efficiency. As a result there has been a growing 
regulatory pressure over the broadcasters to convert their TV stations from analogue to 
digital transmission. Such a migration is referred to as the Digital Switchover (DSO) 
and has already been adopted in countries like US and UK. Due to the higher spectral 
efficiency of digital TV (DTV) a portion of TV analogue channels become entirely 
vacant after the DSO. Figure 2-3 represents the UK UHF band after the process of 
digital switchover.  
 
Figure 2-3 The UK UHF band after digital switchover as shown in Fitch et al. (2011) 
These cleared channels are quite often misunderstood as the TVWS which they are not 
and are instead referred to as the digital dividend. There have been plans by the 
regulatory bodies such as Ofcom (Office of Communications) in UK for re-auctioning 
the digital dividend spectrum. However TVWS originate, as after transitioning to DTV 
there are typically a number of TV channels available on geographical basis which are 
not being used by DTV stations. These vacant TV channels are basically the guard 
bands and are present to avoid interference to adjacent or co-channel DTV stations. 
These are referred to as the TVWS or interleaved spectrum. 
It is interesting to note that if the guard bands were originally deployed to avoid 
interference then how any other device can use it for its own transmission purpose.  So 
the idea is to use low power devices over these locally vacant TV channels. These 
devices are referred to as the white space device (WSD) and because of their low power 
specifications they do not cause interference to co-channel and adjacent channel TV 
stations.  
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2.3.2 Quantifying the TV white space availability 
Experimental modeling tools are being developed and studies (Nekovee (2010)) are 
being carried out in order to quantify the availability of TVWS which is primarily a 
function of the way TV networks are planned. However it is important to note here that 
there are no standard methods which have been devised on how to compute the amount 
of TVWS spectrum available. A number of factors are going to play a crucial role in 
determining how much of this spectrum could be used for the sharing purpose and 
identification of suitable metrics and time/spatial resolution is an important area of 
future research. One of these metrics is expected to be location or area of operation and 
correspondingly rural areas will have a higher quantity of white spaces/interleaved 
spectrum to offer as compared to the dense urban areas. The power level at which the 
cognitive radios are allowed to transmit also play an important role in quantifying the 
availability of TVWS. As when a high power cognitive device operates in a vacant TV 
channel, energy leakage to adjacent channel may cause interference to adjacent 
frequencies, which may be occupied. Consequently, in some future use cases, cognitive 
devices may be constrained not to use vacant channels whose adjacent channels are 
used for TV broadcasting. As shown in Figure 2-4 the available TVWS capacity for 
different locations in UK decreases considerably by imposing the adjacent channel 
interference constraint. Finally, the incompetency of existing wireless technologies to 
make use of white spaces available in non-contiguous fashion also restricts the access to 
TVWS. For example, in the case of London although a total of 96 MHz TVWS is 
principally available, only 16 MHz can be utilized for contiguous frequency access 
(Nekovee(2010)). 
Market Mechanisms Towards Secondary Spectrum Usage 
19 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Available TVWS capacity for low-power cognitive access in 18 UK locations without 
(green bars) and with (red bars) adjacent channel interference constraint as shown in 
Nekovee(2010) 
 
2.3.3 Standardization efforts 
A number of activities are undergoing within the cognitive radio research communities 
and also in industry for the standardization efforts towards managing TV white spaces. 
We discuss a few of them (IEEE 802.11af, 802.19.1 and 802.22 and IETF PAWS) in 
this section. 
IEEE 802.22 
IEEE 802.22 is a standard for cognitive wireless rural area networks. The goal of this 
standard is to use CR techniques to share geographically unused spectrum allocated to 
the television broadcast service, on a non-interfering basis, to bring broadband access to 
hard-to-reach low-population density areas typical of rural environments. IEEE 802.22 
WRANs are designed to operate in the TV broadcast bands while ensuring that no 
harmful interference is caused to the incumbent operation and low-power licensed 
devices such as wireless microphones. 
The two methods used in IEEE 802.22 for spectral awareness are geo-location database 
and spectrum sensing. The 802.22 network quickly modifies its operating frequency so 
as to only operate on channels unused by licensed transmissions. Thus, the 802.22 
network must both quickly identify which channels are allowed to use, and move to a 
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new unused channel if the current operating channel becomes occupied by a licensed 
transmission. 
IEEE 802.19 
The purpose of this standard is to enable the family of IEEE 802 wireless standards to 
use TV white space by providing standard coexistence methods among independently 
operated TVWS networks and dissimilar TVWS devices. IEEE 802.19.1 coexistence 
system consists of three logical entities, coexistence enabler, coexistence manager, and 
coexistence discovery and information server. A logical entity is defined by its 
functional role and its interfaces with other IEEE 802.19.1 coexistence system entities, 
or external elements. 
IEEE 802.11af 
Usage of TVWS for enhanced type of Wi-Fi like internet services popularly known as 
Super Wi-Fi/Wi-Fi 2.0/White-Fi has been formalized as a new standard called as IEEE 
802.11af. It is expected to provide much higher speed and wider coverage than current 
Wi-Fi because of the better propagation characteristics of the VHF/UHF bands and it 
could be understood as a wireless network with a CR-enabled access point (AP) and 
associated CR devices as end-user terminals. 
However considering that the signals in TV bands travel much longer distance and have 
a better penetration into buildings thus it would cause higher levels of interference and 
it needs to be dealt with. Thus it is expected that the APs transmission power limits 
would be set at much lower levels as compared to their ISM band counterparts. The CR 
APs could operate in TVWS either as an unlicensed or licensed secondary device 
depending on the type of spectrum management framework adopted. It could either be 
spectrum commons approach or based on secondary spectrum markets.  
Considering the unlicensed secondary devices, it is important to understand how this 
scenario differs from the usage of same within the ISM band. In case of TVWS the 
unlicensed secondary users need to make sure that the primary users are not using the 
spectrum if the transmission is on opportunistic basis. However in case of unlicensed 
use of ISM band there is no such requirement as the primary does not exist.  
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IETF PAWS
5
 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is developing a WG called Protocol to Access 
White Space database (PAWS) with the goal of defining the device-database interface 
for TVWS database systems. According to PAWS, a WSD must access a database to 
get the list of available channels for its location. There could be several databases 
serving WSDs so that a database to database interface may be useful. However, PAWS 
initial work is focused in the user/device interface with the database. 
Devices may be able to connect to the database directly or indirectly via the Internet or 
private IP networks. This interface needs to be: radio/air interface agnostic (802.11af, 
802.16, 802.22, LTE etc.), spectrum agnostic (the protocol should be able to use in any 
spectrum band), globally applicable (applicable in any country ensuring uniformity) and 
it must address regulatory requirements (the interface has to be flexible to adapt to 
different regulatory requirements). 
PAWS WG is working towards specifying both a database identification mechanism 
(how can a device know which database it needs to connect to) and contents of the 
queries and responses. This messaging between the device and the database needs to be 
secure (authentication, integrity of the content, etc.), requiring some authentication and 
security measures. The WG is still working and developing the initial proposal for the 
protocol. 
2.4 Enabling technologies for future spectrum management 
This section describes those technologies which would constitute as the building blocks 
for a number of architectures which have been proposed for future Dynamic Spectrum 
Access systems.   
2.4.1 Cognitive radio 
After studying the diverse ways in which the future spectrum management could be 
undertaken, one common feature which could be observed is the requirement of 
introducing cognition capabilities in the existing system. Hence a lucid understanding of 
Cognitive Radio concept is of prime importance as it is the underlying principle of 
                                                          
5
 https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/paws 
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technologies which are being pitched as key enablers for new spectrum management 
models. 
We study three different definition of CR starting from the one first proposed by Mitola 
(who is referred o as the father of CR), then as defined by IEEE and finally by the 
Fedral Communications Commissions (FCC) of USA.  
i. Mitola & Magurie (1999) describe the concept of CR as: “transforming radio 
nodes from blind executors of pre-defined protocols to radio-dominated aware 
intelligent agents that search out ways to deliver the services that the user wants 
even if that user does not know how to obtain them”   
ii. IEEE P1900.1 working group (IEEEP1900 (2006)) defines CR as: “a radio in 
which communication systems are aware of their environment and internal state 
and can make decisions about their radio operating behavior based on that 
information and pre-defined objectives.”    
iii. FCC defines CR as: “a radio that can change its transmitter parameters based on 
the interaction with the environment in which it operates. The majority of 
cognitive radios will probably be SDR but neither having software and not being 
programmable are requirements of cognitive radio” 
CR is often referred as being frequency-agile because of its capability to transmit and 
receive across channels covering potentially very wide range of frequencies, even 
across multiple discontinuous bands.   What we observe is that the definition of CR has 
evolved and the recent definitions given by IEEE and FCC have gone narrower in scope 
primarily corresponding to radio systems having adaptive spectrum awareness. Such 
systems are going to be based on configurable radio platforms such as SDR. Looking at 
the current CR devices developed by various research groups and industry players, we 
find that majority of those are based on SDR technology. 
2.4.2 Software defined radio 
Tuttlebee (1999) defines SDR as: “technology wherein software modules run on a 
generic hardware platform consisting of digital signal processing (DSP). It enables on-
the-fly reconfiguration of radio characteristics, such as frequency modulation, power 
and waveform, and allows the same hardware to be reconfigured for use in different 
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parts if the radio spectrum”. As prevalent with any other CR technology prototyping, 
standardization and commercialization of SDR technology is still at an early stage and 
is currently facing challenges such as high power consumptions, high processing power 
requirements and high initial costs. 
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) Reconfigurable Radio 
Subsystems (RRS) working group has a separate SDR related standardization work for 
base stations and the mobile devices. ETSI RRS considers mobile device SDR as the 
underlying implementation technology and enabler for CR (Mueck et al. (2010)). It has 
identified a set of capability requirements for SDR equipments as highlighted below: 
i. Multiradio configuration capability: SDR equipment in mobile device is 
expected to install, load and activate a radio application while running a set of 
radio systems already. 
ii. Multiradio operation capability: SDR equipment in mobile device is expected 
to execute a number of radio systems simultaneously by taking into account 
temporal coexistence rules designed for their common operation 
iii. Multiradio resource sharing capability: SDR equipment in mobile device is 
expected to execute a number of radio systems simultaneously by sharing 
computation, memory, communications and RF circuitry resource available on 
the radio computer platform by using appropriate resource allocation, binding 
and scheduling mechanisms. 
2.4.3 Cognitive radio networks 
A cognitive system for accessing radio spectrum is not going to be composed of a single 
cognitive radio but instead a number of CR entities are going to operate in a networked 
architecture. Thus it brings out the need to study the CR network architecture in detail. 
CR networks can be divided in two groups, the primary network and the cognitive 
network. The primary network is a licensed network that has exclusive right to access to 
a specific frequency band. Cognitive networks do not have a license to operate in the 
desired band, and is often referred to as the secondary network.  
As defined in Thomas et al. (2006), the fundamental components and architecture of a 
CR network includes the following –  
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 Primary User: A primary user has a license to operate in a certain spectrum 
band. Its access can be only controlled by the base-station and should not be 
affected by other unauthorized users. 
 Primary Base-Station: Primary base-station is a fixed infrastructure network 
component with a spectrum license. Sometimes, primary base-station may 
require both licensed and CR protocols for the primary network access of CR 
users. 
 Cognitive Radio User: is an unlicensed user, so the spectrum access is allowed 
only opportunistically. The CR user should have the capabilities of spectrum 
sensing, spectrum decision and spectrum mobility. It has to be able to 
communicate with other CR users apart from the base-station. 
 Cognitive Radio Base-Station: CR base-station is a fixed infrastructure 
component with CR capabilities. It provides single hop connection to CR users 
without spectrum access license. 
CR users can communicate both with the base stations and other CR users and as a 
result there are three types of access networks possible – Cognitive Radio Network 
Access (occurs when a CR user access its own base station), Cognitive Radio Ad Hoc 
Access (occurs when CR user communicates with other CR user through an ad-hoc 
connection) and Primary Network Access (occurs when a CR user access the primary 
base-station through the licensed band).  
2.4.4 Database systems 
Before discussing details of database system as enabling technology for future spectrum 
management models, we would like to mention about sensing which is going to be 
important for non cooperative DSA systems involving opportunistic usage of spectrum. 
Sensing techniques would be required by CRs to monitor and sense the available 
spectrum bands in order to detect the spectrum holes or free portions. Akyildiz et al. 
(2006) describe a number of sensing methods such as primary transmitter detection, 
primary receiver detection and interference temperature management.  Since we are 
focusing on cooperative DSA, understanding of different database systems and their 
architecture holds more importance as compared to sensing technology.  
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A database system provides an alternate to sensing technology for enabling CR kind of 
operation. Geo-location technology plays an important role in this system as it is 
required for an unlicensed device to determine its location (using a GPS receiver) and 
report it while accessing the database. In fact according to US FCC Second Report and 
Order (R&O) in which the TV white spaces have been allocated to unlicensed use 
allowing the operation of cognitive devices on license-exempt basis, database system 
has been set as a primary tool for interference management. In UK on the other hand, 
Ofcom has proposed a use of both database system and sensing techniques. Having 
gauged the current policies being adopted by regulatory bodies and efforts being put in 
by the industry players, geo-location database seems to be the most important 
mechanism in providing a technically feasible and commercially viable solution (at 
least in short-term) for white space spectrum detection, primary user protection, agile 
transmission techniques, and the etiquette protocols for intra- and intersystem 
coexistence in TVWS (Fitch et al. (2011), Nekovee (2010)). 
Ofcom lists down five key issues which must be addressed when implementing a 
database system: 
 What kind of information is required from a CR device to database(s)? : 
Parameter such as device location is essential. Device type, preferences etc. 
could also be provided. 
 What kind of information is going to be returned from the database(s) to the 
device? : A list of vacant channels and allowed transmit power levels for the 
geographical location in consideration. 
 How often the database(s) needs to update its information and hence the 
periodicity with which CR devices will be required to re-consult? : According to 
Ofcom recommendations, devices should consult the databases every two hours. 
We have also tried to answer this question using our simulation model which 
will be discussed in the chapter focused on results obtained from evaluation of 
market mechanism design.  
 What are the modeling algorithms and device parameters to be used to populate 
the database(s)? : There are some recommendations depending on the 
transmission model, device sensitivity, methodology etc. 
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 Who and on what terms should be responsible for the maintenance of the 
database(s)? :  Depending upon different value network configurations there are 
a number of possibilities.  
In order to calculate the white space distribution over the frequency bands, the database 
need parameters and information such as primary user‟s operating frequency, 
transmitted power, size and type of transmit antenna etc. These parameters are provided 
to the database system by primary users. A secondary user has an access to a database 
system for getting information about the primary users in a given area. The secondary 
users interact with the database to know which frequencies are free at certain time and 
in a certain location and determine the maximum transmission power they are allowed 
to use as set by the regulatory/standardization bodies.  
Hence in order to construct a TVWS DSA system, information regarding TV 
transmitters and radio microphones can be registered in a database, and then a GPS 
enabled white space device can query the database periodically to find out the 
availability of vacant TV channels in a specific area and time. According to Borth et al. 
(2008) the TVWS system can use standard propagation models to ensure that the CR 
devices are outside the protected operational contour of the incumbent system before it 
starts operating in the channel. Now from the perspective of secondary user i.e. a WSD 
there are two important issues which need to be addressed. First being the requirement 
to provide WSD with an additional internet connectivity source to access the database 
information. Secondly, since WSDs are required to provide their accurate location 
information to database and they make use of GPS technology for this purpose thus it is 
required to identify a novel solution to counteract the problem associated with poor 
performance of GPS receivers in an indoor environment.   
In context of database centric DSA system, Master-Slave architecture for white space 
devices has been proposed by various standardization bodies. Under this configuration a 
master device connects to the database to obtain a set of available frequencies in their 
area and the slave devices obtain information about the vacant channels from the master 
devices. Thus a slave device does not need to contact the database on its own as it is 
completely managed by its master. The radio network in the white space is created by 
the master device which can be an access point that establishes a Hot Spot coverage, a 
base station that establish cellular coverage, or a device that establish a peer-to-peer or 
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ad-hoc network (IETF PAWS). An alternate source of internet connectivity is required 
for the master device through which it can send a query message to the database and get 
information about any available vacant channel.   
Different database structure  
We have already discussed a possible Master-Slave architecture which the WSDs are 
likely to adopt in order to realize the commercialization of TVWS usage. Now we 
review ideas of different database structure as proposed in research literature and by 
different industry players in response to FCC call for acting as database administrators. 
As the proposals of TVWS usage include the possibility of operation by either an 
unlicensed or a licensed secondary system, we discuss here the database structure in 
accordance to the type of secondary usage. It is interesting to note that in both the 
scenarios a consensus is being reached on using a two tier approach – a centralized 
database entity aided by a number of locally distributed secondary databases.  Such a 
two tier approach is important for the reason of accurately knowing the location of 
WSDs which is an important input for the algorithms (running in central database) to 
calculate TVWS channels and the powers that could be safely used without causing 
interference to primary users. In case if we make use of a single database only then it is 
possible that the master and slave devices are at different locations which could result in 
inaccurate information on availability/non-availability of TVWS channel. Moreover a 
single tier database approach would result in an overly conservative allocation of 
channels and transmit powers. 
I. Database architecture under licensed and unlicensed usage of TVWS 
First we discuss the usage of TVWS for adapting 3GPP radio standards such as LTE for 
operation in UHF white space bands. Mueck et al. (2010) describes a possible structure 
of database driven access to TVWS by multimode user terminals (terminals supporting 
multiple radio access technologies). These terminals are assumed to have the capability 
of accessing TVWS spectrum bands in order to provide wireless broadband access. The 
entities involved in such a system are going to be - a tier 1 Central Database containing 
information about the available vacant TV channels, a tier 2 control point local in nature 
and closer to the  e-NodeB (base stations) corresponding to the geographical area in 
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concern and finally the multimode user terminals connected to their respective eNodeB. 
This architecture has been illustrated in Figure 2-5. 
 
Figure 2-5 Database driven access to TVWS as seen in ETSI RRS as described in Mueck et al. 
(2010) 
Here the relation between eNodeB and user terminals is similar to that of Master-Slave 
architecture discussed for the case of WSDs in previous section. After gauging a 
capacity crunch and a requirement to access more spectrum, eNodeB sends TVWS 
allocation request to a central control point as shown in Figure 2-5. Being closer to 
eNodeB, a control point can determine eNOdeB‟s location with more precision. The 
control point then inquires the database for availability of TVWS frequency bands at the 
location of eNodeB. If available, the control point sends back TVWS allocation 
response to eNodeB which further notifies the user equipments (UEs) about the 
information of allocated TVWS. The concerned UEs change their operating frequency 
to the allocated TVWS frequency and this information is conveyed by eNodeB through 
the control point to the database so that it can update its list of TVWS availability.    
Next we shift our focus for database structure in the case of unlicensed secondary usage 
of TVWS. Fitch et al. (2011) describes a two-step database approach which is being 
developed for a European FP7 project QoSMOS and its architecture is illustrated in the 
Figure 2-6. 
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Figure 2-6 A possible two step database structure for unlicensed secondary usage of TVWS as 
described in Fitch et al. (2011) 
As per this structure, the secondary database would contain more accurate information 
about the location of the white space devices. It would also have detailed knowledge 
about the system topology such as antenna directives, and the QoS and mobility needs 
of the individual radio links. All this information would result in a more efficient 
brokering of spectrum portfolio from the central database which means a wider choice 
of channels and higher transmit powers available for WSD usage.    
II. Google database architecture 
In order to facilitate rapid development of wireless networking protocol in white spaces, 
earlier this year FCC in US had approved and assigned responsibility to nine companies 
for developing and administering white space databases. Amongst these companies 
were the internet giants like Google and Microsoft. Google has been one of the 
strongest advocates of white space wireless as it considers this technology a way to 
rapidly spread access to the web.  The following Figure 2-7 illustrates the database 
architecture as proposed in Google (2009). 
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Figure 2-7 Google database structure as described in Google (2009) 
Google proposes a flexible and market-driven approach, without posing any limits on 
the number of database providers and correspondingly their database architecture 
specifications. Google from the outset have supported an open architecture model for 
the database. As seen in the figure, a number of interface (WSDB1 – WSDB7) have 
been defined to its database where each interface has a well defined function.  WSDB-1 
and WSDB-2 are used for directly connecting to FCC Commission‟s Consolidated 
Database System (CDBS) which contains information regarding the location and 
channel of protected primary entities such as DTV stations and information about 
location and identification of secondary WSDs (geographical location, FCC ID serial 
number etc.). WSDB-3 is used for general purpose communication with FCC. In order 
to get the available channel list, the WSD will connect the database through WSDB-5 to 
register in the database. The database will calculate the available channels and return a 
list with them to the WSD. Interference is avoided by protecting the TV stations using 
the information fetched from WSDB-1 and WSDB-2 interface. According to Google 
anyone should be able to have an access to the available TV channel list. The WSDB-7 
interface will offer public access to non-confidential information from the Database. 
Since Google plans to cooperate with other database administrators in order to exchange 
the information for better decision making in TVWS calculations, it has introduced 
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another interface WSDB-6 for this process. Other database administrators such as the 
Spectrum Bridge have also adopted similar database architecture.  
III. COGEU database architecture 
COGEU is an EU FP7 project to develop Cognitive radio systems for efficient sharing 
of TVWS in European context. Unlike regulatory bodies such as FCC and Ofcom which 
are only working towards developing an opportunistic DSA model to support 
unlicensed secondary usage of TVWS, COGEU also aims to develop DSA system that 
leverage the value of underutilized spectrum through the introduction and promotion of 
real-time secondary spectrum trading. Thus according to COGEU D3.2 (2010), TVWS 
must be assigned in an optimal manner for unlicensed use by WSDs (spectrum 
commons approach) and for trading use to the spectrum broker (secondary spectrum 
market approach).    
As per the COGEU analysis, geo-location database driven access to TVWS is 
particularly relevant with regards to current regulatory/standardization efforts and they 
have identified two scenarios involving the usage of database for the protection of 
incumbents.  First one being the usage of geo-location database coupled with spectrum 
sensing and the second one involving only geo-location database access. The second 
scenario is of more importance for our market mechanism design as it talks about 
combination of unlicensed access to TVWS and also the secondary spectrum markets 
facilitated by the spectrum broker. The following Figure 2-8 illustrates the different 
interfaces involved in proposed database architecture. 
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Figure 2-8 TVWS access database architecture according to COGEU as described in COGEU D3.2 
(2010) 
The architecture involves the usage of different kind of repositories which are the 
contact points of information during the whole functioning of secondary spectrum 
usage. These repositories include that of geo-location spectrum database, broker internal 
repositories (TVWS occupancy repository, trading information repository and policies 
repositories).  
The coupling of database and cognitive radio allows for optimal use of radio spectrum 
and this mechanism is sufficient for successful and productive implementations of 
various applications in TVWS. Thus what is required is efforts from the regulatory 
bodies and industry players to develop a successful database capable CR technology in 
TVWS. FCC in US recently announced that it will conduct a test of the database of 
broadcast frequencies which will be used for the wireless networking protocol known as 
white space networking. The database for the test was designed by Spectrum Bridge, 
one of the nine companies the FCC chose to manage the system. 
Commercial deployments of TVWS database 
There have already been some commercial deployments of database driven usage of 
TVWS. We present two of such examples, one being the Microsoft WhiteFiServices 
and the other one being that of Spectrum Bridge in this section. 
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I. Microsoft WhiteFiService6 
Microsoft has created WhiteFiService, a research platform to plan a white space 
network. It provides APIs that wireless devices can use to determine the available white 
spaces in a given location. The data about primary transmitters (tower location, TV 
channel, transmit power, antenna height etc.) are provided by the FCC Commission‟s 
Consolidated Database System (CDBS) and the data about the terrain from NASA. The 
attenuation from the transmit tower is calculated following some algorithms. In this 
way, with the device location as input data, WhiteFiService provides the available 
channels in that location. 
II. Spectrum Bridge7 
Spectrum Bridge is a company that provides wireless networks with an ability to 
dynamically access the available spectrum via a database system. It tested an 
experimental White Space Database system for the FCC in January 2009 and has been 
operating a complete online white space solution since January 2009. 
Spectrum Bridge already has several commercial or at least real-state implementations 
like Smart Grid TVWS network and TVWS broadband network in collaboration with 
companies such as Google, Plumas-Sierra Electric Cooperative, Dell etc.  
2.5 Spectrum trading markets 
Spectrum trading markets provides solution to the problem where a user has a sudden 
unanticipated need for spectrum which is not being fulfilled, while there exist other 
spectrum users in the area having idle spectrum. What is required is an organized 
market with well defined procedures which can bring together buyers and sellers to 
benefit for all.  
Song et al. (2009) gives an analysis of incentives to spectrum trading from both macro 
and micro perspective. Amongst the macro factors it lists the changes in demand, 
technology and policy the most important ones and the micro factors include inefficient 
initial spectrum allocation approach and a possible change in service strategy by service 
providers. Spectrum trading can vastly improve the spectrum utilization levels by 
allowing the licensees to be those who value its use the most and by making use of the 
                                                          
6
 http://whitespaces.msresearch.us/ 
7
 http://www.spectrumbridge.com/WhiteSpacesSolutions/showmywhitespace.aspx 
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technology that provides the best economic gains. Competition among service providers 
is also likely to increase under a market supporting spectrum trading.  It would make it 
easier for the new and innovative companies such as Google and Apple to get an access 
to spectrum. This would also stimulate technological innovations since there would be 
interest to have intelligent SDR or cognitive radio based systems to make as much use 
of tradable spectrum as possible and offer services over it (Caicedo & Weiss (2007)). 
ST markets would also help end-users in getting freedom from getting locked to a 
specific service provider and a specific wireless standard. Caicedo (2009) says that 
users can choose and join a service provider with best possible network available at any 
time and geographical location.  
2.5.1 Challenges to overcome for successful ST markets  
Success of ST markets depends upon overcoming numerous challenges posed on 
technical, economical and regulatory front. Tonmukayakul & Weiss (2004) argues that 
central to the issues are the effects of transaction costs associated with leasing. 
Transaction costs depend upon technical factors (flexibility in usage of wireless service 
over traded spectrum, application requirements and advancement in the CR 
technology), economic factors and also different forms of spectrum sharing. Bykowsky 
(2003) supports the above argument by saying that the success of secondary markets for 
trading of spectrum will depend upon the ability of trading mechanism to minimize 
transaction costs. Crocioni (2009) also identifies high transaction costs as an important 
factor which may result to inefficient trading within the markets. Another factor which 
has been considered as an impediment to the success of ST markets is the low spectrum 
trading activity, the main reason of which is attributed to lack of liquidity in such 
markets. Bykowsky (2003), Chapin & Lehr (2007) discusses several steps to enhance 
market liquidity.  Chapin & Lehr (2007) identifies that there are three enablers for 
market liquidity: available spectrum, customer demand, and low transaction costs. 
Interference management in ST markets also requires special consideration as increased 
interference between various services operating in a ST market will have negative 
effects on end-user experience. Caicedo & Weiss (2011) and Crocioni (2009) also point 
out that the spectrum markets can be viable if sufficient number of market participants 
exists and the amount of tradable spectrum is balanced to the demand. 
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According to Caicedo & Weiss (2007) It gets even more complicated if we are trying to 
develop a heterogeneous market place which involves co-existence of more than one 
wireless standard (a multi-protocol wireless architecture)in a spectrum trading area. 
Thus, the tradeoffs of managing several standards versus restricting their number to 
only a few should be carefully analyzed in a ST environment. 
Caicedo & Weiss (2007) gives a classification of technical architecture for the 
implementation of spectrum trading. Infrastructure, configuration methods, activation 
and flexibility are the key elements which have been identified for the classification 
purpose. It argues that the choice of architecture would determine what kind of possible 
interactions could occur from the technical viewpoint. Also different architecture would 
require a different set of technical elements, protocols and capabilities for 
implementation which will have consequences in terms of information flows. The 
following table as given in Caicedo & Weiss (2007) summarizes the classification in 
terms of different technical configuration and its impact on the functioning of spectrum 
trading –  
Table 2-2 Classification of technical architecture for implementation of spectrum trading done in 
Caicedo & Weiss (2007) 
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With our objective of developing a heterogeneous ST market model, configuration and 
flexibility are two vital parameters for architecture design. As seen from table above 
both of them are closely interlinked and determine whether the usage of multiple 
wireless standards over a ST region is possible or not. Hence what we aim for is a 
distributed technical architecture with a flexibility of using multiple wireless protocols.   
2.5.2 Analogies with other trading markets 
During the past decade, the electric utility industry has been using a spot market in 
electric power to match supply and demand on an hourly basis. Nord Pool Spot 
8
 runs 
the leading power market in Europe. 
The spectrum markets based on spectrum trading could also be considered  a spectrum 
management framework resembling financial markets used for trading of financial 
instruments (such as stocks, bonds) among investment banks, hedge funds etc. These 
markets are secondary in nature in the same sense that stock exchange is a secondary 
market. In equities, the primary market is the Initial Public Offering (IPO) whereas in 
spectrum the primary market would be an auction or beauty contest (Weiss & Lehr 
(2009)). According to Kasbekar et al.(2010) just as in secondary financial markets, ST 
markets would not only allow the trading of raw spectrum (bandwidth), but also of 
different kind of other services (such as Wi-Fi capacity) derived from the usage of 
spectrum (for example the unlicensed ISM band). However the financial market‟s stock 
trading mechanism cannot be entirely adopted as it is for the ST markets owing to the 
difference in nature of radio spectrum from stock market commodities. The most 
important challenge to counter is how a tradable commodity can be constructed given 
that spectrum at different frequencies (and their availability for use at different location 
and times) is not identical in its specifications. Spectrum usage must satisfy certain 
temporal and spatial constraints that are unique. For example, simultaneous operation in 
adjacent frequency bands is bound to cause interference in neighboring locations; 
however it is not an issue for geographically disparate locations.     
2.5.3 Different spectrum trading mechanisms 
Various framework and mechanism which would facilitate in accomplishing ST 
markets have been discussed in the research literature. According to one of the 
                                                          
8
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framework as discussed in Barrie et al. (2010), ST markets are visualized as two tier 
markets, the upper tier consisting of spectrum owners that trade spectrum assets 
analogous to land rights (selling and buying of spectrum usage rights for long durations 
– months/years), and the lower tier comprising of spot markets where spectrum owners 
lease out spectrum for small durations (hours/days) at specific locations.  Thus upper 
tier adopts the DSA model based on cooperative primary sharing while the lower tier 
adopts the cooperative secondary sharing model. 
Analysis done by Yoon et al. (2010) suggests that secondary trading methods could be 
based on three different mechanisms – auctions, direct trading and a brokerage system. 
All these different spectrum trading mechanisms form the basis while designing our 
market mechanism for secondary usage of spectrum. 
I. ST model based on brokerage system: In this model, the broker manages the 
trading information in between the spectrum users. Its primary task is to match 
the buyers and sellers in an optimal manner for which it receives a brokerage fee 
for every matched trade. Generally the commission is decided to be a fixed 
percentage of total value of trade. Brokerage architecture has been mainly 
focused on computer network systems such as the grid network. 
 
Figure 2-9 Framework for secondary trading market by broker as described in Yoon et al. (2010) 
Chapin & Lehr (2007) illustrate the emergence of new intermediaries within a DSA 
marketplace. One such new intermediary most likely to emerge is a Broker as expected 
in a trading scenario. A broker would insure market liquidity and low transaction costs 
considered to be key elements for a viable trading market. Chapin & Lehr (2007) brings 
out a possibility of three different categories of spectrum brokers.  
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a) Simple spectrum broker – which has a simple task of matching buyers and the 
sellers 
b) Spectrum distributor type 1 – has a role of delivering QoS-differentiated 
spectrum access to the Service provider 
c) Spectrum distributor type 2 – in addition to above specified roles; it also takes 
the responsibility for the safety of secondary spectrum access.  It may install and 
operate the system required to determine when secondary operation in a given 
band and at a given location is safe.  
The following Figure 2-10 illustrates the three different categories of spectrum brokers 
as visualized by Chapin & Lehr (2007). 
 
Figure 2-10 Different categories of spectrum brokers as described in Chapin & Lehr (2007) 
As we are attempting to construct a DSA market place involving heterogeneous radio 
access technologies. The above described different types of spectrum brokers could be 
mapped to various possible market scenarios. For example in the case of business model 
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involving offloading the mobile data traffic to Wi-Fi APs, a variation of first kind „Wi-
Fi capacity broker‟ could be efficient. The main reason being that the unlicensed 
frequency band can‟t assure any kind of QoS and thus a task of the broker would be no 
more than being a mediator between the demand and supply side. However when we 
consider the spectrum sharing or trading in TVWS, issues pertaining to QoS and 
interference avoidance can assume a more important role and hence would require a 
Spectrum distributor of Type 1 or 2 as a mediator. 
II. ST model based on auctions: Under this mechanism, spectrum buyers procure 
the required spectrum from the sellers through an auction trading process. The 
role of spectrum auctioneer could be assumed by a government organization 
(regulatory bodies) or private spectrum exchange acting as a third party. 
 
Figure 2-11 Framework for secondary trading market by auction as described in Yoon et al. (2010) 
III. ST model based on mutual trade (Direct Trading):   In this mechanism no 
third party is involved between the sellers and buyers. The trade happens based 
upon mutual agreement of leasing cost and time. An alternative way of looking 
at this model is to consider it as a revenue sharing mechanism where the 
secondary user shares a fixed percentage of it revenue with the primary user. 
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Figure 2-12 Framework for the secondary trading market by direct trading as described in Yoon et 
al. (2010) 
 
2.5.4 Spectrum Trading Markets evaluated using Agent Based Modeling 
The research literature on the simulation and evaluation of spectrum trading markets is 
very sparse. There have been few efforts to simulate the markets using the concepts of 
agent based modeling and we present those in this subsection.  
Caicedo & Weiss (2011), Chu et al. (2010), Yoon et al. (2010), Tonmukayakul & Weiss 
(2005) have used ABM for simulating and addressing different challenges associated 
with ST market. Caicedo & Weiss (2011) uses ABM for providing guidelines regarding 
the number of market participants and the amount of tradable spectrum required in ST 
market to make it viable. Given their modelling parameters they found that a minimum 
of six active participants were necessary for making the ST markets viable. Using ABM 
Yoon et al. (2010) analyses three different mechanisms – a brokerage mechanism, 
auctions and direct trading; on which ST markets could be based upon. According to 
Yoon‟s model direct trading provides a more active market with or without regulation.   
Tonmukayakul & Weiss (2005) develops an agent-based spectrum access model to 
examine the pre-conditions required for successful emergence of ST market. Chu et al. 
(2010) propose an agent-based spectrum trading model to address the challenge of 
finding the most profitable strategy of agent(s) when spectrum demand is uncertain. 
Prior research work on ST markets using ABM reveals that it could be used to study 
both economical and technical aspects of the spectrum sharing. 
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3. Market mechanism evolution 
As seen in previous chapter, studies focusing on improving the efficiency of spectrum 
usage have received much attention and a number of different spectrum management 
models have been proposed. Based on our objective of creating an economically 
favorable scenario for all the spectrum users we decide to go forward with „market 
model‟ amongst all the discussed future spectrum management models.  
The literature on applying trading mechanisms to spectrum management has been 
expanding steadily; however the existing research on spectrum trading market 
simulations primarily concentrates on scenarios involving homogeneous market actors 
where the participating players use similar radio access architecture (one wireless 
standard). This simplifies the trading phenomena by making interference management 
and other potential challenges associated with spectrum trading easier to cope with. 
Through our market mechanism we try to build a generic secondary market which also 
facilitates trading in between heterogeneous market actors. Thus in this section we will 
propose how secondary spectrum trading markets are going to emerge and what role the 
existing as well as new market actors are going to play in its emergence.  
For the success of DSA services, Chapin & Lehr (2007) has already argued that the 
liquidity of spectrum in the market plays a very crucial factor. Further it lists down 
availability of spectrum as one of the key enabler of liquidity. Our market mechanism 
takes an evolutionary approach on similar lines as discussed regarding the factors 
affecting the availability of spectrum in Chapin & Lehr (2007). Since we have adopted 
incremental approach as a central theme for designing our market mechanism thus we 
assume that the following incremental steps will happen in the evolution process 
towards the realization of secondary spectrum trading markets: 
Step 1 Wi-Fi Capacity Market  
Step 2 Super Wi-Fi Capacity Market 
Step 3 Spectrum Leasing Market  
According to Chapin & Lehr (2007) the success of DSA services must be first 
demonstrated with their initial deployment in the simpler bands where the spectrum 
access etiquette required is less complex in nature and as a next step DSA must be 
extended to other spectrum bands where there are strict requirements of protecting the 
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incumbent primary users. The evolutionary approach which we adopt for our market 
mechanism finds resonance with this argument. Adopting such a strategy would help in 
maintaining a step-wise increase in availability of spectrum over time which would 
ensure the liquidity of spectrum required for market success.   
Wi-Fi capacity market represents initial step in this direction and thus we will first 
design the case of capacity trading in ISM band which are available to use on 
unlicensed terms and with minimum set of restrictions. Next we move over to the 
scenarios demonstrating the realization of trading markets for TVWS based on either 
local area or wide area strategy. As per local area strategy, Super Wi-Fi capacity trading 
markets are introduced where Wi-Fi operators operating in TVWS act as secondary 
users. Then under wide area strategy TVWS spectrum leasing markets are introduced 
where MOs operating on a contiguous band of TVWS act as secondary users. The 
necessity of protecting the TV broadcaster‟s transmission against interference makes the 
operation of trading markets more complex in TVWS as compared to that in ISM band. 
Later in this section we will introduce the modeling tool used for evaluating the 
designed mechanism and will also discuss the intricate details involved in setting up the 
model (i.e. market assumptions and model configuration).   
3.1 Value network design 
We make use of value network configurations to illustrate the working of different 
spectrum trading scenarios. Under this VNC scheme, we adopt the representation of 
different technical component, their role and corresponding actors undertaking those 
roles from Casey et al. (2010) as shown in Figure 3-1. Technical components interact 
through their technical interface while actors have their business interface for 
interacting with other market actors under different trading scenarios.     
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Figure 3-1 Representation for technical component, role, actors and different interfaces adopted 
from Casey et al. (2010) 
The following Figure 3-2 illustrates the value network design of our market mechanism. 
This figure is an all inclusive one since it illustrates the functioning of each incremental 
step we have assumed to happen in the evolution process towards the realization of 
secondary spectrum trading markets.  It is important to note here that our market 
mechanism is mobile operator centric since we have assumed that only MOs have a 
subscriber relationship and it does not exist for any other market player. As per this 
assumption we only model the data demands of MO‟s subscribers which represent a 
valid argument considering that demands for mobile broadband has been growing 
exponentially and as a consequence of which MOs are most likely to search for new 
capacity and spectrum resources. The incremental steps towards the realization of 
spectrum markets and the actors participating in each of those steps are described in the 
following sub-section.   
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Figure 3-2 Value Network Design of market mechanism illustrating all incremental steps towards 
secondary spectrum trading markets
9
 
 
3.1.1 No trading market scenario description 
We begin with a scenario (Base case) which depicts the current market situation and it 
involves the participation of MOs, LAOs and MO subscribers as shown in Figure 3-3. 
The primary role of MO has been defined as that of providing mobile broadband 
services to its subscribers. It is also assumed that MO‟s network infrastructure has 
cognitive capabilities in terms of cognitive base stations, support for SDR technology, 
spectrum sensing etc. for realizing DSA systems when required.  
 
                                                          
9
 Note that a box enclosing all the market actors except MO subscriber denotes the simulated part of 
market mechanism. MO subscribers have not been modeled explicitly within our model. 
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Figure 3-3 Part of value network design illustrating no trading market scenario    
The MO subscriber‟s primary role is that of mobile broadband consumption and they 
are assumed to have frequency-agile radios which are able to switch to the assigned 
band and use the appropriate modulation and coding format. It would also require some 
kind of signalling overhead in between MO and its subscriber in order to notify which 
particular band to use. 
Depending on the market scenario, LAOs either operate in ISM or in the TVWS band 
and correspondingly they require access points which are IEEE 802.11b/g and IEEE 
802.11af standardized as part of their network infrastructure. The role of such LAOs 
could be taken over by commercial Wi-Fi operators, Wi-Fi hot spot providers and other 
companies offering Wi-Fi access, venue/facility owners etc. 
MOs serve data demands of their subscribers primarily using their macro cellular-
network infrastructure. The business interface between them is defined in terms of a 
data subscription agreement and on the technical level both of them possess the required 
CR technologies providing them the capability to participate in different market 
scenario. MOs experience network congestion if they do not have sufficient capacity to 
fulfill their subscriber‟s data demands and at the same time it is possible that there exist 
LAOs within same geographical region and with availability of excess unused capacity. 
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However as shown in Figure 3-3 there exists no facilitator which could provide MOs 
and LAOs a platform to interact and perform capacity trading. This situation clearly 
represents a scenario where a mismatch exists between demand and supply of data 
capacity as MOs and LAOs function independently.  
3.1.2 Wi-Fi capacity market scenario description 
Next we discuss the case of Wi-Fi capacity markets (Case1) which is built upon the 
scenario presented in the base case. In order to create a functioning trading market, it is 
required to have an intermediary for pooling the resources and matching the supply and 
demand sides of the equation. Hence we introduce a new market entity, i.e. a spectrum 
exchange (SpecEx) to facilitate the capacity trading. The structure of spectrum 
exchange is such that it acts as an information registry (spectrum database) of the 
amount of capacity available with different LAOs and their corresponding APs 
distributed over a geographical region. A capacity broker operates within a spectrum 
exchange with a role of matching the offers to lease extra capacity posted by the LAOs 
and offers to buy excess capacity posted by the MOs. With the introduction of spectrum 
exchange the market situation changes and is shown in following Figure 3-4. 
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Figure 3-4 Part of value network design illustrating Wi-Fi capacity market scenario 
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The functioning of Wi-Fi capacity trade occurring in between MOs and LAOs 
facilitated by spectrum exchange is illustrated in the above figure where along the 
technical interface a generic protocol to access the spectrum database exists which is 
used by the MOs to query for availability of APs with excess capacity and is used by 
the LAOs to report the presence of their APs with available excess capacity. Then along 
the business interface the MOs post their offer to buy the amount of excess capacity and 
LAOs post their offers to lease extra capacity. A payment mechanism exists in between 
MOs, spectrum exchange and LAOs such that the trading and brokerage fee is received 
by the spectrum exchange. 
Once a successful trade is completed MOs get temporal rights to use the leased capacity 
from LAOs until the new trading cycle begins. When the offers to buy and sell are 
matched in between MOs and LAOs, a time-limited capacity lease agreement is decided 
between them. Accordingly the flow of payment occurs from MOs to LAOs depending 
upon the amount of capacity which has been leased. At the technical interface an 
interworking architecture is used (as described in the literature review chapter) to 
offload the MO subscriber from their cellular-network infrastructure to local area 
network. 
3.1.3 Super Wi-Fi capacity market scenario description 
As an evolution of the previous case we discuss the super Wi-Fi capacity markets 
(Case2). Super Wi-Fi basically represents Wi-Fi kind of operation in TVWS which has 
also been referred to as the Wi-Fi 2.0, White-Fi and Wi-Fi on steroids.  The market 
configuration consists of LAOs (having super Wi-Fi enabled APs), MOs, spectrum 
exchange and a new market entrant i.e. Television broadcasters (TVBs) as shown in 
following Figure 3-5. 
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Figure 3-5 Part of value network design illustrating super Wi-Fi capacity market scenario 
As when TVBs decide to participate in trading markets their primary task becomes 
protection of their transmissions from the interference which could be caused by the 
operation of secondary users. Thus the allocation of TV spectrum to LAO for Wi-Fi 
kind of operation is supported by a TV white space database which represents the 
required technical component. 
We envision the realization of this case in the form of three-tier trading market. At the 
first stage there is an interaction between LAOs and TVBs facilitated by the spectrum 
database. LAOs identifies the available white spaces using the database and then 
accesses it as an unlicensed secondary white space device. A revenue sharing 
mechanism exists over the business interface in order to compensate TVBs for 
secondary usage of their licensed band and in some case even causing interference to 
their transmissions. It is important to note here that LAOs do not get an exclusive usage 
right of the white space, thus there is a possibility of multiple unlicensed secondary 
devices existing together.  
At the next stage there is an offloading interaction between MOs and LAOs facilitated 
by spectrum exchange. This offloading interaction is similar to the one we discussed in 
previous sub-section and can be considered as spectrum subleasing where TVBs are 
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acting as indirect supplier of capacity to MOs. As it can be seen in Figure 3-5, the 
features of technical and business interface are also same as what we discussed for the 
previous trade scenario. 
Thus within this trading scenario TVBs make extra profits out of their otherwise unused 
portions of spectrum, LAOs gets an access to new spectrum for providing Wi-Fi kind of 
services to their subscribers and MOs gets the required capacity to ease its network 
congestion.  
3.1.4 TVWS spectrum leasing market scenario description 
Finally, we discuss the market based on spectrum leasing (Case3) which represents the 
last incremental step in our evolutionary approach. In this case primary user (i.e. TVBs) 
grants exclusive usage rights to a licensed secondary system (i.e. MOs) in TVWS for a 
pre-defined lease time through an auctioning process. A time limited spectrum lease 
agreement is decided upon in between the MO and TVB at the business interface and 
payment mechanism is in accordance with the price which is an outcome of auction. At 
the technical interface MOs require the CR capable base stations for accessing and 
using the TVWS band obtained through auction.  
Market configuration consists of MOs, SpecEx and TVBs as shown in Figure 3-6. 
TVBs now replace LAOs as a direct supplier of spectrum to MOs. We model this 
scenario with spectrum exchange being a facilitator based on auctioning mechanism.  
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Figure 3-6 Part of value network design illustrating TVWS spectrum leasing market scenario 
The functionality of this spectrum exchange is similar to the one discussed before with 
the only difference that it involves the role of auctioneer rather than a capacity broker. 
Auctioning facility is required since a contiguous band of TVWS is put up for auction 
where MOs post their bidding price depending upon their requirement for extra 
spectrum while TVBs post their ask price to auctioneer within SpecEx. Auctioneer then 
decides the winning MO who is given usage rights for utilizing the allotted band for a 
fixed duration as agreed over the length of lease time. Considering that MOs get an 
exclusive access to TVWS and do not expect interference from any other secondary 
system, they can offer a guaranteed QoS for their services which was not possible in the 
offloading scenario. 
3.2 Agent based model of market mechanism 
We use agent based modelling for evaluating the designed market mechanism. After 
having reviewed the tutorials on ABM and research work conducted on setting up and 
simulating the spectrum trading markets using ABM, we have identified it to be an 
efficient and resourceful tool for simulating different trading scenarios within our 
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market mechanism. Next we give a short background introduction to ABM and further 
discuss how it has been used for setting up our model.    
3.2.1 Background for Agent Based Modeling 
ABM is a new approach towards modeling in which individuals and their interaction 
with each other and their environment are explicitly represented within a simulation tool 
used for the modeling purpose. This makes it possible to explore the connection 
between the micro-level behavior of individuals and the macro-level patterns that 
emerge from the interaction of many individuals. As mentioned before these individuals 
used for the modeling purpose are referred to as the agents who have their pre-defined 
behavior and capability to make independent decisions. 
Macal & North (2010) in their tutorial for Agent Based Modeling and Simulation 
(ABMS) have listed down situations for which ABM can offer distinct advantages to 
the conventional simulation approaches and once it has been identified that the ABM is 
the correct modeling choice, Macal & North (2010) gives the general steps in building 
an agent model. These steps are described as followed: 
 Step 1: one needs to identify the different type of agents (along with their 
attributes) which would be required to define the whole system. 
 Step 2: the environment in which agents are going to live and interact with needs 
to be defined. 
 Step 3: defining how the agent behavior going to evolve as a result of their 
interactions amongst each other and their interaction with the environment. 
 Step 4: to define which agents are going to interact and under what conditions 
do they interact during the simulation. 
 Step 5: after following all the above steps, the final step lies in simulating the 
model in the chosen ABM software environment.  
ABM tools provides an edge over the traditional modeling and analysis tools and as a 
result it is now being used for modeling purposes in various fields such as in Biology 
(population dynamics, ecological networks etc.), Social Sciences, Economics (financial 
markets, trade networks) etc.  ABMS has its roots in complex adaptive systems (CAS) 
where the system design principles are based on bottom-up approach in contrast to the 
top-down approach taken in case of, for example system dynamics another method used 
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to model dynamic behavior. Moreover ABM provides the flexibility of working with 
large number of autonomous and heterogeneous agents which becomes a complex task 
to perform in other modeling methods such as in system dynamics.  Next we introduce 
and compare some of the popularly used toolkits for building small scale ABM. 
ABMS modeling toolkits  
A number of free and open source multi-agent programmable modeling environment 
are available to use. Depending on the scale of system to be modeled different toolkits 
are available such as the NetLogo
10
  developed at Northwestern's Center for Connected 
Learning and Computer-Based Modeling (CCL) and REPAST (Recursive Porous Agent 
Simulation Toolkit) Simphony
11
 (North et al. (2007)) developed by the Argonne 
National Laboratory. Proprietary toolkit such as AnyLogic
12
  is also available. For a 
small scale model (with number of agents extending to hundreds) desktop based ABMS 
tools are sufficient and could be designed on a workstation with ease, however in case 
of large scale models (with number of agents extending from thousands to millions) 
high performance computing clusters may be required.  These software environments 
come with extensive documentation and tutorials. They are also equipped with models 
library, which is a large collection of pre-written simulations that can be used and 
modified.  
For our simulation purpose we have used the latest release of Repast Simphony (2.0) 
which is a Java based modeling system. It provides an option of building the model 
either in ReLogo or in Java. ReLogo is an agent based modeling domain specific 
language (DSL) which has been written in Groovy programming language. The 
advantage of using ReLogo is that it comes in with a number of predefined primitives
13
. 
These primitives act as the building blocks which could then be put together while 
modeling the complete system. One gets the similar flexibility (in terms of available 
primitives) while developing the model in NetLogo as well; however we decided to go 
forward with Repast ReLogo as our choice of modeling tool primarily due to the 
following two reasons: 
                                                          
10
 http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo 
11
 http://repast.sourceforge.net 
12
 http://www.xjtek.com/ 
13
 http://repast.sourceforge.net/docs/api/relogo/ReLogoPrimitives.html 
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 Considering that Repast Simphony ReLogo has an Eclipse based integrated 
development environment (IDE), it has a better user interface and is easier to 
work with as compared to NetLogo   
 The most important reason being ability to develop more complex models with 
lot more functionalities using Java (the tool can seamlessly integrate Java and 
Groovy components, thus a project could start off as a small and simple model 
developed using ReLogo and later it could be extended into a large scale 
complex model using Java). 
Thus in order to extend the scope and bring in more sophistication within the model, 
Repast represents a better choice as an ABM toolkit compared to NetLogo.  
3.2.2 Classifying market actors as different type of agents 
Our trading model comprises of heterogeneous market actors which we refer to as 
spectrum users (SUs) offering different wireless services in their respective spectrum 
bands. SUs include the mobile operators, local area operators and television 
broadcasters. LAOs are further classified as  LAOWi-Fi operating in ISM band using 
IEEE802.11b/g standardized access points and  LAOWi-Fi2.0 operating in TVWS using 
IEEE802.11af standardized APs. All of the above described SUs represent the demand 
and supply side of trading market; however one also requires specific market entities to 
find an optimum match between demand and supply. Spectrum exchange takes on that 
role as a trading venue for executing trades. As discussed in the previous section, 
depending upon the trading scenario SpecEx can be based on brokerage mechanism 
(Case1 and Case2) or on auctioning mechanism (Case3). 
We have broadly classified all the actors participating in our ST markets under three 
categories of agents – consumer agent (CA), supplier agent (SA) and facilitator agent 
(FA). As we mentioned before that our market mechanism is MO centric and the 
trading markets have been set-up in such a manner that it is always the MOs who 
assume the role of CA. This assignment of MO being CA can be confusing as MOs are 
the service providers and not the consumers themselves. However if we look it in terms 
of our model assumptions according to which MO subscribers are not modeled 
explicitly but their demand for data is reflected in terms of traffic demand within MO‟s 
network then it seems logical to consider MO as CA.    
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The role of SA is to facilitate CA in meeting their subscriber‟s mobile data demands 
either through leasing their own excess capacity (the capacity left with a SA after 
having served their own subscribers) or through a lease of unutilized portions of their 
spectrum. Depending upon the different trading scenario, a SA could be LAOWi-Fi, 
LAOWi-Fi2.0, TVB (indirect) or TVB (direct).  The role of FA is to match the demand 
and supply side; hence it includes SpecEx with either a brokerage or auctioning 
functionality. 
Considering that Agent based modeling is characterized by objectives of its individual 
agents which fundamentally represent the agent behaviour, within our model each one 
of the above described market participant (i.e. SUs, SpecEx as broker, or SpecEx as 
auctioneer) are modeled as autonomous agents who have a pre-defined behavior. 
Behavior of different agents  
Next we discuss the behaviour of agents present in our market mechanism. The 
different interactions which we studied in Figure 3-2 are guided by these behaviours, 
analysis of which can provide insights into the characteristics of different trading 
scenarios. 
I. Consumer Agent: behaviour is illustrated using the flow chart diagram shown 
in Figure 3-7. As discussed before, MOs act as consumer agents in our model 
with an objective to fulfil the mobile broadband demand of their subscribers and 
maximize their profits. Thus MOs determine the amount of traffic to be served 
using their traffic demand function and whether they can serve this traffic using 
their own network resources or not. If MOs are not able to serve this traffic 
demand, they are required to make decision regarding the type of trading 
scenario to participate in. Depending on this decision, it is determined which all 
other type of agents does MOs interact with, since different trading scenario 
involves the participation of different market players.   
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Figure 3-7 Flow chart representation of consumer agent behavior 
 
If MOs take the offloading path, they post their requirement of excess capacity 
to the broker functioning within spectrum exchange as shown in Figure 3-8. The 
Market Mechanisms Towards Secondary Spectrum Usage 
56 
 
broker then matches the demand and assigns whatever excess capacity is 
available with the LAOs on a lease basis. Depending upon the capacity which is 
leased, MOs update their mean traffic demand function as part of the feedback 
mechanism implemented within the model and configure the network 
infrastructure required to make use of the leased capacity. 
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Figure 3-8 Flowchart representing CA behavior during offloading scenario 
However in case of spectrum leasing scenario (Figure 3-9), MOs first calculate 
their bidding price using the zero-intelligence-plus (ZIP) bidding strategy (Cliff 
& Bruten (2007)) as explained in Appendix B. This bid price is then posted to 
the auctioneer functioning within the spectrum exchange based on which the 
winner is decided. The winning and losing MO adjusts its profit margin 
according to ZIP bidding strategy as a mark of their preparation for next bidding 
round. And the winning MO configures the network infrastructure required to 
make use of leased TVWS spectrum. 
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Figure 3-9 Flowchart representing CA behavior during spectrum leasing scenario 
II. Facilitator Agent: objective is to provide a platform for execution of trade 
between CA and SA. As described before the SpecEx can have a functionality of 
a broker or an auctioneer depending upon the type of market. In case of the 
auctioning mechanism, bids are posted in the SpecEx where the auctioneer finds 
the winner amongst the bidders and allocates the TVWS spectrum.  
However in case of brokerage mechanism, FA collects capacity demand 
requirements from CA and availability of capacity from SA. Then it follows a 
pre-defined procedure to match the buy and sell orders. This pre-defined 
procedure has been described in following flow chart diagram (Figure 3-10) for 
FA (i.e. broker here). According to this procedure broker maintains two lists for 
its operation – a demand (D) list (from the MOs) and a supply (S) list (from the 
LAOs). Using this list broker finds out the MO who has the maximum demand 
(Dmax) for capacity and the LAO who has the maximum supply (Smax) of 
capacity available. It then tries to match the demand and supply according to 
following procedure. 
If Smax is greater than Dmax (implying that entire demand of the chosen MO can 
be fulfilled from excess capacity available with only one LAO), broker assigns 
the required capacity (equivalent to Dmax) to the corresponding MO, updates its 
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D and S list and moves over to capacity demand of next MO. On the contrary if 
Dmax is greater (implying that entire demand of the chosen MO cannot be 
fulfilled through excess capacity available with only one LAO and instead more 
number of LAOs would be required), broker assigns the capacity equivalent to 
Smax to the chosen MO, updates its demand and supply list and moves over to 
next LAO who can offer the required capacity.  These operations are repeated 
until the maximum of either of supply or demand list becomes zero.  
Once the matching of buy and sell orders are completed FA waits for the next 
trading cycle to be executed after the defined lease time. Figure 3-10 illustrates 
the FA behavior in case of spectrum exchange based on brokerage mechanism. 
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Figure 3-10 Flow chart representation of facilitator agent behavior with brokerage functionality 
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III. Supplier Agent: objective is to maximize profits from its un-utilized capacity or 
spectrum. SA links with the FA by posting their sell orders (of excess capacity) 
to the broker in case of capacity trading markets and posting their ask price (for 
the band of TVWS spectrum) in case of spectrum leasing markets. Therefore, 
SA participates in trading market whenever it has excess capacity or unused 
spectrum on offer. 
3.3 Market assumptions and ABM configuration 
This section describes the assumptions (within the ABM framework) which have been 
used for setting up the different market scenarios described through the value network 
design (Figure 3-2).  The market mechanism design is built on the assumption that there 
exists the required technology for realizing the trading scenarios discussed before. The 
technology for deploying cognitive radio networks and DSA is assumed to have 
developed to a stage where it can be relied upon for facilitating secondary spectrum 
access. 
For our analysis we model the aggregate traffic demand for each SU with an 
exponential distribution which is characterized by its mean and has been referred to as 
mean traffic demand (mtd) within the model. We also assume that the traffic demands 
faced by SUs are not correlated. One prime reason for this assumption being that within 
the ABM, one needs to model autonomous agents having their behaviour independent 
of any other agent. Thus any kind of correlation within traffic demand would violate 
that requirement of ABM.  
We have also included a feedback mechanism for the mean traffic demand as 
experienced by consumer agent network (i.e. MOs). This feedback mechanism is used 
to model the MO‟s subscriber behaviour of consuming more mobile data with 
fulfilment of their previous demands. This assumption find a close harmony with ideas 
put forward related to energy consumption and behavior by the economists Khazzoom 
and Brookes.  According to Khazzoom-Brookes postulate (Saunders (1992)), increased 
energy efficiency tends to lead to increased energy consumption. And also within agent 
based model developed for Yoon et al. (2010), simulations have been performed with a 
similar kind of assumption where the demand for the spectrum resource increases with 
time according to Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) – based stochastic process. 
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The parameters which we have assumed for representing the operating environment for 
MOs and LAOs are presented in the tables A-1 & A-3 (in Appendix A). All the 
assumptions made for designing different trading instances have been explained in 
detail within Appendix A. Here we present the important ones required to understand 
the simulation model. 
Our trading model assumes its operation in a dense urban region with an area of 
approximately 1 square kilometer with a presence of three mobile operators and 900 
access points uniformly distributed over the entire region. For our analysis we have 
assumed different configurations according to which these access points are shared 
amongst different LAOs. The configuration is represented in terms of – (number of 
LAOs) x (number of APs) and for our simulations it varies as (10x90), (30x30) and 
(90x10).  
LAO‟s average spectral efficiency is assumed to be higher as compared to that of MO, 
since devices typically reside indoors and closer to the LAO access points than the MO 
base stations. Amongst two different kinds of LAO, LAOWi-Fi2.0 is assumed to have 
three times higher spectral efficiency as compared to LAOWi-Fi. An important thing to 
note here is that our trading market works as a non-real time market since the trade 
cycle take place at pre-defined time intervals. Thus the matching of demand and supply 
can‟t be executed at any time.  
Next we discuss the revenue-cost model used for our simulations. It is important to 
break down and analyze all revenue and cost components involved in a trading scenario. 
Table A-4 (in Appendix A) lists all the values assumed for the revenue and cost 
components involved in capacity trading scenario. For a MO revenue earned per 
subscriber is assumed to be higher in offloading scenario as compared to the case where 
it gets an exclusive access to operate in TVWS. In spectrum leasing case, MO needs to 
deploy its own network infrastructure that results in higher CAPEX which is not 
required to a same extent during offloading scenario. Different cost components 
included in the model are – leasing cost (fixed component and usage based component), 
trade facilitation cost which include the transaction cost, brokerage cost and auction 
cost. The details of all this cost components have been provided in Appendix A. 
During the auctioning process of TVWS channels, the cost of spectrum to MO depends 
upon the bid posted by it. We have adopted the zero-intelligence-plus (ZIP) bidding 
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strategy for our simulations and the agents (CA and SA) make use of it for posting their 
bids in the market after they have decided on their limit order (LO) price (i.e. maximum 
price a buyer is willing to pay and minimum price a seller is willing to sell during an 
auction). We have assumed here that the mobile operator (i.e. CA) having larger 
subscriber base has higher willingness to pay for the spectrum and hence the LO prices 
are calculated accordingly. As a result the LO price for the MOs has following 
relationship –  
(LO)MO1 > (LO)MO2 > (LO)MO3 
Limit order price for the TV broadcasters (i.e. SA) is a sensitivity analysis parameter 
and it is varied as –  
(LO)TVB < (LO)MO3 
(LO)MO3 < (LO)TVB < (LO)MO2 
and (LO)MO2 < (LO)TVB < (LO)MO1 
Analysis of Case3 is done over these three conditions and activity in a market starts 
with a series of mock auctions so that SUs can find an initial starting price for trading.  
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4. Simulation Results 
In this chapter, we will demonstrate and evaluate the important features of our 
simulated agent based model. We will illustrate the results obtained by evaluating 
different trading scenarios and also analyze them to deduce some interesting 
observations. We discuss all these results with regards to the value network design of 
our market mechanism (Figure 3-2).  The following Table 4-1 summarizes the cases 
which we are going to evaluate.  
 
Table 4-1 Different trading market scenario 
Case Scenario Consumer Agent Supplier Agent Facilitator Agent 
 
Base Case MOs  None None 
Case 1 MOs LAOWi-Fi SpecEx on brokerage mechanism, 
Capacity Broker  
Case 2 MOs LAOWi-Fi2.0 
TVB (indirect) 
SpecEx on brokerage mechanism, 
Capacity Broker 
Case 3 MOs TVB (direct) SpecEx on auctioning mechanism, 
Auctioneer 
 
We evaluate the trading scenarios on two different fronts. One based on the traffic 
model (Table A-1 and A-3 in Appendix A) assumptions and other based on revenue and 
cost model assumptions (Table A-4 in Appendix A). The analysis based on traffic 
model gives an insight into the data volumes carried by different operators under 
different trading cases. Under this analysis we plot the total volume of traffic carried (in 
GB/day) on Y-axis and on X-axis we have different operators arranged in order of their 
popularity (i.e. larger the volume of traffic carried by operator‟s network, higher is its 
popularity). 
The analysis based on revenue and cost model gives an insight into the performance of 
different market players which further gives an insight into an optimal range for the 
length of lease times. We define the performance of market players involved in different 
market scenario as followed: 
Performance criteria over Wi-Fi and Super Wi-Fi capacity markets i.e. Case 1 and Case 
2 –  
 MOs =  [Revenue from offloaded subscribers]  – [Costs incurred (leasing + 
brokerage + transaction)] 
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 LAOs = [Revenue from leasing capacity to MOs]  – [Costs incurred (brokerage 
+ transaction)] 
 SpecEx14 = Revenue from facilitating trade between MOs and LAOs 
 Capacity Broker14 = Revenue from providing brokerage facility to MOs and 
LAOs 
 TVBs14 = Revenue from sharing mechanism with LAOs  
Performance criteria over TVWS spectrum leasing scenario i.e. Case 3 –  
 MOs = [Revenue from subscribers served through leased TVWS spectrum] – 
[Costs incurred (leasing + auctioning + transaction)] 
 TVBs = [Revenue from leasing TVWS spectrum to MOs] – [Costs incurred 
(auctioning + transaction)]  
Since we have the length of lease time as a sensitivity analysis parameter we evaluate 
the performance of all the market players over varying length of lease times. Such an 
analysis is useful in determining the optimum range of lease time for different trade 
scenarios, which we discuss it later in upcoming sections. As discussed in chapter 2, 
transaction costs associated with trading must be reasonable for spectrum trading 
markets to become practical since it is one of the key enabler for ensuring liquidity in 
the markets. Transaction costs primarily emerge in the process of searching for 
opportunities (capacity/spectrum to lease or buy) and thus have an explicit relationship 
with working model of brokers and spectrum exchange. However we look into some 
implicit relationships of transaction costs using our revenue and cost model such as its 
relation to LAO configuration, length of lease time and trading activity within the 
market. 
The analysis using revenue-cost model (Table A-4 in appendix A) is performed 
according to following steps and is primarily used for finding the optimal length of 
trading cycle for different configurations and the best case scenario: 
1. For each case (1 or 2), and correspondingly within each configuration we find 
the optimum lease time.  
                                                          
14
 Note: we have assumed cost overheads for SpecEx, brokers and TVBs to be small and thus have 
neglected it from the performance criteria of these actors.  
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2. Next we compare different configurations (within same case) across the 
optimum lease time obtained using Step1. This step helps in identifying the best 
configuration within each case. 
3.  Once the optimum lease time and the best configuration have been identified, 
we compare case1, case2 and case3 for finding the best case scenario in our 
model. 
4.1 Base case – No trading scenario 
A common feature which emerges out from our first analysis based on the volume of 
data traffic carried within the operator‟s network for different LAO configurations 
(10x90, 30x30, 90x10) is that it has a long tail shape (Anderson (2004)) where the MOs 
carry the bulk amount of traffic and the LAOWi-Fi contributes to the tail. Figures 
illustrating the volume of data traffic carried by operators (under different LAO 
configuration) when they are arranged in order of their popularity are presented in 
Appendix C and we collectively refer these figures as long-tail curves. Here we present 
the result for 10x90 LAO configuration as shown in Figure 4-1.  
 
Figure 4-1 Long tail shape of traffic volume for operators when no trading market (10x90 LAO 
configuration) 
These long-tail curves were expected and seem logical considering that we are 
comparing consolidated mobile data capacity represented by three MOs with 
fragmented Wi-Fi capacity represented by a number of LAOs spread over a 
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geographical region. Hence this result also partly validates our model and the 
assumptions we have made for different parameters in setting it up. 
The simulation result also brings forward a strong case for a Wi-Fi capacity trading 
market. As observed from the simulation results (illustrated in Figure 4-2), there exists a 
large amount of excess capacity available with Wi-Fi local area operators and at the 
same time MOs fall short to fulfill subscriber traffic demand. This represents a classic 
case of demand and supply mismatch. Figure 4-2 suggests that even though LAOWi-Fi 
operators would not be able to completely fulfill the excess capacity demands of MOs; 
however they can be helpful in reducing congestion faced by MOs to some extent. 
Considering that it is expensive for the MOs to increase their existing network capacity, 
they can lease capacity from LAOs and offload some of its subscribers to LAO network 
during times of congestion. 
 
Figure 4-2 Mismatch between the demand and supply of capacity 
4.2 Case1 – Wi-Fi capacity markets 
Assuming that the Wi-Fi capacity trading markets have been deployed, on analyzing the 
total amount of traffic carried within the operator‟s network when they are arranged in 
order of their popularity we observe that the tail of the long-tail curves rises as shown in 
Figure 4-3 for 10x90 LAO configuration. 
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Figure 4-3 Long tail shape of traffic volume for operators when Wi-Fi capacity markets introduced 
(10x90 LAO configuration) 
We observe this phenomenon since LAOWi-Fi networks carry the offloaded data traffic 
of MOs as well. Another interesting observation is that the head of the long-tail curves 
also goes up for this scenario. This can be explained because of the feedback 
mechanism implemented within the model reflecting subscriber‟s behavior of 
consuming more mobile data once their initial demands are fulfilled. This increase in 
data requirement is partly met through MOs own network capacity (i.e. MO network 
utilization level increase) and partly through the offloading procedure.  
We use the revenue-cost model (Table A-4 in Appendix A) to find an optimum range of 
lease time for different LAO configurations. The decision framework is based on the 
win-win scenario we aim to achieve for all the market players defined by high 
performance of MOs and LAOs, broker and SpecEx. Hence we analyze their 
performance over varying length of trading cycles (ranging from 500 to 10,000 
seconds) and obtain the results as presented in Figure 4-4 for the case of 10x90 
configuration and in Figure 4-5 for the case of 90x10 configuration. We observe that for 
lease times in range of 2000-4000 seconds cumulative performance of MOs and LAOs 
is better as compared to other length of lease times. If we compare the performance of 
the broker and spectrum exchange, then understandably it is higher for the smaller lease 
times (100-2000 seconds) which results in more number of transactions over a day and 
hence higher revenues. But since we are working within win-win framework, lease time 
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in between 2000-4000 seconds would be a good choice for optimum length of trading 
cycle.      
 
Figure 4-4 Case1: Performance of market players over varying length of lease time for a 10x90 
LAO configuration 
 
 
Figure 4-5 Case1: Performance of market players over varying length of lease time for a 10x90 
LAO configuration 
In order to better understand this behavior we further analyze how the transaction and 
brokerage costs (i.e. trade facilitation costs) vary with the different lease times and with 
different LAO configurations. The variation of transaction and brokerage costs with 
lease times is illustrated in Figure 4-6. We observe an interesting trade-off existing 
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between trade facilitation costs, length of trading cycle and extent of trading activity in 
the market. With shorter lease times (100-500 seconds) the associated trade facilitation 
costs are so high for MOs that it negates all the advantage gained out of capacity 
trading. However in case of very long durations of lease times (8000-10000 seconds), 
these costs are very low but there isn‟t enough trading happening in the market which is 
not a favorable scenario for any of the agents. Thus it is required to find a middle 
ground which is favorable for all the market entities. 
 
Figure 4-6 Case1: Variation of brokerage and transaction costs for MO with varying length of lease 
time 
After concluding that there exists an optimal range for the length of lease time, we 
further compare different LAO configurations over this range. The details of the process 
behind this analysis have already been described before. Based on it we observe that 
MOs performs best in case of a centralized LAO configuration 10x90. The main reason 
for this could be attributed to the fewer transactions which are required for trading the 
same amount of capacity in a centralized LAO configuration as compared to the 
decentralized one (as shown in Figure 4-7). Moreover assuming that a MO lease same 
amount of capacity in both centralized LAO and decentralized LAO case, the 
cumulative usage based lease cost (being paid to LAOs) is going to be same in both the 
cases. However the fixed component of lease cost is going to vary. It is going to be 
much higher in decentralized case as the MO is required to deal with more number of 
LAOs and is required to pay each one of them the fixed component of the lease cost.  
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This observation supports the drawback put forward in Caicedo & Weiss (2007) 
regarding the adoption of distributed configuration as technical architecture for realizing 
spectrum trading. Caicedo & Weiss (2007) says that an architecture that supports 
distributed configuration might have higher transaction overhead and thus, possibly 
higher transaction costs for each trade configuration. 
 
Figure 4-7  Comparison of MOs performance under centralized and decentralized LAO 
configuration (Case1) 
Finally, as a result of the introduction of capacity trading mechanism, MOs excess 
capacity requirement is fulfilled to a great extent. However there are still instances 
where MOs are in need of more capacity which cannot be satisfied by LAOWi-Fi 
operators. As it can be seen in Figure 4-2 the cumulative excess capacity required by 
MOs is higher as compared to the cumulative excess capacity available with LAOs, thus 
one needs to look beyond the Wi-Fi capacity markets. Moreover the mismatch between 
the demand and supply of capacity would get even worse once we take into 
consideration that the subscribers would consume even more data once their initial 
demands are fulfilled. 
4.3 Case2 – Super Wi-Fi capacity markets 
In order to counteract the above mentioned problem we introduce Super Wi-Fi capacity 
markets and analyze the simulation results to gauge its effectiveness in solving MO‟s 
network congestion issues.  Similar to the previous cases we first analyze the total 
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arranged in order of their popularity and as mentioned before we obtain a long-tail 
shape. However because of higher spectral efficiency on offer by super Wi-Fi which 
enables LAOsWi-Fi2.0 to fulfill all the extra capacity requirements, the tail further goes up 
as shown in Figure 4-8 for 10x90 LAO configuration.  
 
Figure 4-8 Long tail shape of traffic volume for operators when Super Wi-Fi capacity markets 
introduced (10x90 LAO configuration) 
One interesting observation here relates to the traffic volume profile of the MOs 
constituting the head of these long-tail curves. Because of large amount of excess 
capacity on offer by Super Wi-Fi LAOs and the feedback mechanism for traffic demand 
implemented within our model, we observe that the head of the long-tail curve rises to 
such an extent that all the MOs now utilize their network capacity to maximum limits 
and approximately carry the same volume of traffic (Figure 4-8).  
In order to find an optimal length of lease time for this case we perform an analysis 
similar to the one explained in previous section for the Wi-Fi capacity markets. The 
results are shown in Figure 4-9 for (10x90) configuration, in Figure 4-10 for (30x30) 
configuration and in Figure 4-11 for (90x10) configuration. Here again we observe that 
the lease time should be in the range of 2000-4000 seconds, for which all participating 
entities have high performance levels.   
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Figure 4-9 Case2: Performance of market players over varying length of lease time in case of 10x90 
configuration 
 
 
Figure 4-10 Case2: Performance of market players over varying length of lease time in case of 
30x30 configuration 
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Figure 4-11 Case2: Performance of market players over varying length of lease time in case of 
90x10 configuration 
As our next step of analysis we identify the LAO configuration for which cumulative 
performance of MOs is better as compared to in other configurations. Here again the 
simulation results reaffirm the importance of adopting a centralized LAO configuration 
(i.e. 10x90) because of the involvement of low transaction and brokerage cost as 
compared to in decentralized scenario as shown in Figure 4-12.  
 
Figure 4-12 Comparison of MOs performance under centralized and decentralized LAO 
configuration (Case2) 
We further analyze the brokerage and transaction cost variation with lease times, the 
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brokerage costs are much higher here which could be attributed to higher volumes of 
capacity being traded and higher leasing cost assumed for this scenario. On a more 
generic level we observed the same trade-off happening between transaction and 
brokerage costs, length of trading cycle and extent of trading activity in the market 
which was visible for the Wi-Fi capacity trading markets as well.  
 
Figure 4-13 Case2: Variation of brokerage and transaction costs for MO with varying length of 
lease time 
Another interesting observation we deduce from our simulation results is that the MOs 
requirement of excess capacity is completely fulfilled. LAOWi-Fi2.0 provides sufficient 
capacity to cater to the traffic demands of its own subscribers and that of MOs 
offloaded subscribers which could be observed from the simulation logs which shows 
that the excess capacity requirement of MOs is equal to zero after the introduction of 
Super Wi-Fi markets. This demonstrates the potential which Super Wi-Fi market holds 
in solving the issues pertaining to congestion in MO network.   
4.3 Case3 – MO leasing TVWS band for exclusive usage 
Finally, we analyse the simulation results for the TVWS spectrum leasing scenario 
where a contiguous band of TVWS is put up for auction and assigned to one of the 
MOs. For this case instead of iterating over different lengths of trading cycles, we make 
an assumption that TVWS band is leased out for a single day. This gives an opportunity 
to other MOs to bid higher during the next trading cycle and get an access to TVWS 
spectrum band. 
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Figure 4-14 shows how the traffic volume carried within operator‟s network when they 
are arranged in order of their popularity evolves as we take incremental steps towards 
the TVWS spectrum leasing markets. The MO winning the auction experiences a sharp 
increase in the volume of traffic carried within its network and it peaks up attaining a 
very high value. This phenomenon could be attributed to the fact that all the traffic now 
flows through MO‟s own network infrastructure deployed for accessing the leased 
spectrum which was not the case in capacity trading scenarios where the traffic flow 
was distributed in between MO‟s own network and LAO‟s network (for the offloaded 
subscribers). For the other MOs who were not successful in winning during that 
particular auction round, the traffic carried in their network is same as in the Base case, 
since we have not included the possibility of offloading to LAOs within this trading 
scenario. And as offloading doesn‟t happen thus the tail of the long-tail curve goes back 
to its initial state as observed for the base case. 
 
Figure 4-14 Long tail shape of traffic volume for operators when TVWS spectrum leasing markets 
introduced (10x90 LAO configuration) 
As we analyze performance of different MOs and TV broadcasters for this case, we 
observe that only MO1 makes profit while for rest of the MOs leasing an entire band of 
TVWS is not a profitable venture. Considering that we have assumed MO1 to have a 
larger subscriber base, it has higher willingness to pay for the spectrum band and hence 
sets its limit order price higher than others. As a result of which MO1 wins the auction 
round more often than other MOs. 
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Finally we evaluate different trade scenario to identify a suitable strategy which could 
be adopted for the usage of TVWS spectrum. Super Wi-Fi capacity markets represent 
the local area strategy as the secondary users in this case are the LAOs while TVWS 
spectrum leasing markets represent wide area strategy with MOs being the secondary 
users for this case. We compare these trading scenarios studied as part of our 
evolutionary approach and weight the performance of MOs and TVBs against each 
other to identify which of the above two strategies perform better. As another 
performance metric we compare the aggregate volume of traffic served to the 
subscribers in each of the case with a notion that whichever trading scenario serves 
higher data volume might be more successful than other.  Based on these comparisons 
we make our observation regarding the strategy which may offer more benefit for the 
usage of TVWS spectrum. The results of first comparison are shown in Figure 4-15 and 
for the second comparison in Figure 4-16. 
 
Figure 4-15 Comparison of MOs and TVBs performance over Super Wi-Fi capacity markets and 
TVWS spectrum leasing markets 
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Figure 4-16 Comparison of different trading cases over the aggregate volume of data traffic served 
to subscribers 
We observe from Figure 4-15 that both MOs and TVBs perform better in case of super 
Wi-Fi capacity markets. It is interesting to note here that TVWS spectrum leasing 
markets perform poorly even though we assumed the cost associated with auctioning 
and transaction process to be zero as described in Table A-4 (Appendix A). Even a 
comparison on the last performance metric i.e. the aggregate volume of traffic served in 
a day also brings out Case2 a clear winner as shown in Figure 4-16. Hence based on our 
evaluation of these simulation results local area strategy seems to offer more benefits 
for TVWS spectrum usage. 
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5. Conclusions  
This chapter discusses the implications of results deduced from ABM simulations and 
also provides a summary of results. The directions in which the current work could be 
extended are also discussed later in this chapter.  
5.1 Discussion 
The existing centralized and traditional approach (i.e. command and control) towards 
the spectrum management has already been identified as the root cause for inefficient 
allocation of radio spectrum. This demands for a more decentralized and liberalized 
approach to be adopted by the regulators such that the spectrum could be accessed by 
the users in an optimized and efficient manner.Thus in this thesis we discussed different 
possible spectrum management framework for future wireless services and applications, 
ranging from unlicensed to opportunistic use to secondary spectrum trading. Each 
framework has its own advantages but also numerous challenges to overcome. It would 
be too early to identify one of these spectrum management models as a clear winner and 
project it as the chosen strategy moving into future. However since we argued for a 
scenario where all the market players benefit (i.e. a win-win situation) and are 
motivated to participate in realization of future spectrum management models; the 
secondary trading framework demonstrated by our market mechanism seems to have an 
edge with respect to potential market acceptance. 
Spectrum trading is considered to be a market mechanism which would ensure 
maintaining economically optimal spectrum consumption. Realization of ST markets 
would depend on overcoming a number of challenges on technical front, but apart from 
that the spectrum liberalization policies adopted by regulatory bodies would also play 
an important role in making such market place a success. The regulators could be taken 
into confidence once a successful trading scenario is demonstrated in those spectrum 
bands which have minimal restrictions to use. Thus the evolutionary approach adopted 
in our market mechanism towards implementing ST markets is very logical. 
Accordingly the first easy and practical step could be a successful implementation of 
Wi-Fi capacity trading (in ISM band), follow it up by Super Wi-Fi capacity trading (in 
TVWS) and finally implementing the TVWS spectrum leasing markets.  
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As we evaluated these market scenarios using agent based modeling, some interesting 
observations were made regarding the behavior of different trading instances. Our 
simulation results demonstrated and provided support to the arguments being made in 
research literature that success of secondary markets depends a lot on achieving low 
transaction costs. Based on our simulation results we observed an interesting trade-off 
existing between the length of lease time, the costs involved for facilitating trade and 
the extent of trading activity in the market. A generic behavior observed during our 
analysis was that if lease time is too short then it results in very high transaction and 
brokerage costs while on the other hand for longer length of lease time there is not 
enough trading activity happening within the market which adversely affect the 
economic conditions of trade facilitators such as spectrum exchange and brokers.     
Hence the time scale of spectrum trading turns out to be an important aspect for 
realizing an effective real-time trading regime. It poses technical and mechanism 
challenges associated with keeping transaction costs of frequent trading manageable. 
This observation implies that an optimal range for the length of lease time could exist 
for which the involved trade facilitation costs do not outweigh the economic advantages 
attained by the market entities participating in trading markets. Existences of such 
optimal range of trading cycles were demonstrated through our simulation results and 
even though the values obtained for optimal lease times are subject to vary with the 
assumptions made for setting up our model, on a high level it does reflect the 
importance of being aware of these optimal range as it might be required while 
designing the actual DSA system. 
The assumptions we made regarding the traffic volume carried in operator‟s network for 
different trading scenario find a close harmony with ideas put forward related to energy 
consumption and behaviour by the economists Khazzoom & Brookes according to 
which increased energy efficiency leads to increased energy consumption. A similar 
phenomenon is expected with mobile data consumption and our simulation results for 
the analysis of traffic carried within the operator‟s network (the long-tail curves) for 
different LAO configurations demonstrates its occurrence. 
Based on our simulation results, Super Wi-Fi capacity markets performed better as 
compared to other trading scenarios which we evaluated. These results have interesting 
implications for the kind of strategy which might be adopted for the allocation of 
Market Mechanisms Towards Secondary Spectrum Usage 
80 
 
TVWS spectrum band. As per our observations it would be more beneficial to allocate 
TVWS for local area kind of operation rather than being allocated to wide area 
operators for their exclusive usage. To support the above argument if we compare 
spectral efficiency of these two kinds of operators we observe that local area operators 
have higher spectral efficiency as compared to the wide area operators for indoor 
locations where most of the traffic demand is likely to arise. Thus in that case trading 
markets based on local area strategy are more likely to be successful. However there 
also exists a possibility of adopting a strategy which involves the involvement of both 
wide area and local area operators, an optimal mix of some kind, such a scenario has not 
been simulated and forms the part of future research.  
It is important to note here that because of a lack of prior empirical data available and 
uncertainties surrounding the structure, functioning and participants within ST markets, 
a number of assumptions had to be made when building our simulation model. The 
results which we have presented are subject to change with variations in the 
assumptions made for setting up the model.  
5.2 Results summary 
In this thesis we focussed on devising market mechanisms towards secondary usage of 
radio spectrum between heterogeneous set of market players. We were successful in 
demonstrating trading instances in between mobile operators, local area operators (Wi-
Fi and Super Wi-Fi enabled), TV broadcasters and spectrum exchange (based on either 
brokerage or auctioning functionality) representing a set of heterogeneous actors. Using 
the value network design of our market mechanism we projected how the markets are 
going to evolve towards the secondary spectrum trading scenario. We further simulated 
and evaluated these trading markets to draw conclusions which are expected to provide 
inputs on technical, economical and regulatory front for institutionalizing ST markets as 
a tool of future spectrum management.  
We summarize all the results by restating our research questions and inspecting how 
well were those questions answered.  Our research was primarily driven by the 
following questions –  
 What is state of the art literature on secondary spectrum usage? 
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 Which of the future spectrum management models being discussed in 
research literature fits in our objective of designing a ‘win-win’ 
market mechanism? 
 What are the key features to design a practical and readily implementable 
market mechanism facilitating secondary spectrum trading? 
 What incremental steps will happen in the evolution process towards 
the secondary spectrum trading markets?  
 Under which conditions and assumptions is the co-existence of multiple 
secondary users and systems within the proposed market mechanism 
economically favorable for all? 
 What impact does introduction of trading markets have on volume of 
traffic flowing through network of different operators? 
 What impact does the length of lease time have on realizing a 
successful ST market scenario? 
 Which of the two strategies – local area or wide area, is more 
probable to be adopted for usage of TVWS spectrum? 
To answer the first question we performed a literature review spanning over future 
spectrum management models, Wi-Fi offloading model, key enabling technologies for 
future spectrum management, TVWS spectrum opportunities and spectrum trading 
markets. We observed that much of the literature on the secondary spectrum use has 
been on developing technologies and system for opportunistic use representing the non-
cooperative form of spectrum sharing and literature on cooperative secondary sharing is 
relatively sparse. However research carried out for the cooperative form of DSA is 
growing and is also seen to have numerous benefits over the non-cooperative DSA. In 
order to better understand the various spectrum management models being discussed in 
literature we classified those under three categories - license exempt model, non 
cooperative secondary usage model and market model based on cooperative secondary 
usage of spectrum.  
We identified that market model based on cooperative secondary usage of spectrum fits 
in our objective of designing a ‘win-win’ market mechanism and thus we adopted 
spectrum trading as underlying principle on which our market mechanism was 
designed. During the literature review we discussed a number of spectrum database 
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architecture and deduced that spectrum database seems to be promising and pragmatic 
choice on technology front which would help in realizing a number of future spectrum 
management models. Thus we included spectrum database amongst the other technical 
components required for the functioning of our market mechanism. 
 To answer the second question we designed a value network configuration of the 
market mechanism using incremental approach.  We proposed that the following 
incremental steps will happen in the evolution process towards the realization of 
secondary spectrum trading markets: 
Step 1 Wi-Fi Capacity Market  
Step 2 Super Wi-Fi Capacity Market 
Step 3 Spectrum Leasing Market  
The value network design of our market mechanism included different technical 
component, their role and corresponding actors undertaking those roles. Our design 
demonstrated the working of each of the above mentioned incremental steps and also 
illustrated the various interactions which are likely to occur between heterogeneous 
actors participating in different market scenario. We then simulated the designed market 
mechanism using ABM toolkit which simplified the process of modeling interaction 
between different actors because of a number of in-built primitives available with the 
toolkit.    
In order to answer the final set of research questions we analyzed the results obtained 
from our ABM simulations. Here again ABM proved to be very resourceful in 
evaluating the performance of incremental and evolutionary steps towards secondary ST 
markets. Within the scope of assumptions used in setting up our ABM simulations we 
observed that traffic volume carried through different operator‟s network had a long tail 
shape where MOs carried the bulk amount of traffic constituting the head while LAOs 
carried only small volumes of traffic and constituted towards the tail portion. With 
introduction of different trading scenario the profile of head and tail of these long-tail 
curves varied as the volume of traffic carried within network of LAOs and MOs 
increased substantially. Hence introduction of ST markets resulted in higher utilization 
of available network resources.   
Our analysis also showed that there exist optimal range for the length of lease time for 
which all the participating market players find themselves in economically favorable 
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condition and thus meeting our objective of creating a win-win scenario. Given our 
modeling parameters this optimal length was observed to be in the range of 2000-4000 
seconds over a day of capacity trading. Further when different LAO configurations 
were compared it was observed that the centralized LAO configuration performed better 
compared to the decentralized one. Variations in the brokerage, transaction and lease 
costs for different length of lease times and different LAO configurations largely 
attributed to the observation made above.  
 As a final step within our incremental approach, TVWS spectrum leasing markets were 
analyzed and compared with the capacity trading markets on the basis of -   
 MO‟s and TVB‟s performance in the corresponding market over a day, and  
 Aggregate volume of traffic carried by the all the operators within their network.  
We observed that Super Wi-Fi capacity trading markets outperformed TVWS spectrum 
leasing market on both of the above chosen metrics. Based on evaluation of these 
simulation results we concluded that adopting a local area strategy for TVWS usage 
seems to bring in more benefits and could indirectly result in high performance level for 
MOs through adoption of capacity trading markets. 
5.3 Suggestions for future research 
Finally, we explore different directions in which the current research work could be 
extended.  Here we discussed different trading scenarios which involved a strategy of 
giving an access to TVWS either to LAOs or to the MOs.  For future work it would be 
interesting to study another scenario where both of these players have a significant role 
to play in TVWS usage. Thus in that case there can be an optimal manner in which the 
access to TVWS by LAOs and MOs could be defined which brings in better economic 
benefits to all the participating market entities such as the TVBs, MOs, and SpecEx etc. 
Such a scenario would be similar to mixed regime as discussed in Hwang & Yoon 
(2009). We can then have a Case4 including Super Wi-Fi operation and TVWS 
spectrum leasing. 
Next if we shift our focus towards the existing agent based model built for this work, 
there is a possibility of bringing in a number of additional functionalities which could 
add value to the existing results and also give new insights in spectrum trading markets. 
As mentioned before, the current model does not factor in any challenges pertaining to 
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interference management, DSA technology in use and quality of service. So as a next 
step, improvements could be brought about in the model by making it sensitive to the 
above mentioned challenges. The ABM toolkit (Repast Simphony) which we have 
chosen for simulation purpose provides a lot of scope for increasing the complexity of 
model as per the requirements. For example there is a possibility to include interference 
based pricing in our revenue-cost model, as currently no costs have been included 
within the model which would reflect the investments required on market player‟s part 
to deal with interference which might be caused during secondary usage of spectrum. Al 
Daoud et al. (2007) studied pricing in cooperative secondary sharing and showed that 
profits are improved when interference based pricing is used as compared to flat rate 
pricing scheme.  
It would also be interesting to study how our proposed market mechanism could be 
deployed in the real world. This would require defining a number of processes for the 
relevant stakeholders and could act as guidelines for them to join the marketplace on a 
voluntary basis. The results from such an exercise could have implications for 
underlying technical architecture and possibly act as a roadmap for realizing secondary 
usage of radio spectrum based on cognitive radio technology.    
Considering that TVWS spectrum is currently being targeted for the initial 
commercialization of DSA-based radio systems for secondary use, our market 
mechanism particularly focused on realizing successful trading in TVWS spectrum (as 
Super Wi-Fi capacity trading and TVWS spectrum leasing instances were simulated). 
However as seen in the literature review ST markets are visualized for other licensed 
bands as well. For example 2.6 GHz band has already been allotted in countries such as 
Finland, Sweden and Norway to MOs for deploying next generation LTE networks. 
However the MOs haven‟t put this band under desired usage and as a result it does not 
bring any economic value. This situation could change if a local area strategy as 
recommended by our simulation results for TVWS is also adopted for 2.6 GHz band 
and it is also brought under the ambit of ST markets. Thus we need to devise market 
mechanisms for other licensed frequency bands also and try to make our model as 
generic as possible.  
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Appendix A: Description of assumption made for ABM 
model 
Table A-1 Traffic model parameters of the operating environment (MO) 
Parameter Description (value assumptions and comments) 
Geographical Area (A) Value = 1km
2
 
Dense urban area 
# of MOs   Value  =3; 
Represents a typical scenario prevalent in developed mobile markets 
# of sector sites per km
2
  Value  =1 (3-sector site); 
Cell radius of 1Km 
Bandwidth (BW) per MO  Value = 20MHz; 
Average spectral efficiency Value = 1.67bps/Hz/sector; 
Max. Capacity per MO (Cmax)  Value = 100Mbps; 
Total user population Value = 5000; 
Distributed as MO1 = 2000, MO2 = 1700, MO3 = 1300 
Initial mean traffic demand per 
MO (mtdi) 
 Value = 50.56Mbps(MO1)  42.98Mbps(MO2)  32.87Mbps(MO3); 
Traffic demand is exponentially distributed   
Total simulation time (Tsim)  Value = 86400 ticks (1 time tick = 1sec); 
Simulating trading over one day 
Length of lease time (tlease) Varied as – 100,500,1000,2000,4000,8000,1000 time ticks 
Sensitivity analysis parameter 
Tradable entity Capacity lease in Mbps; Spectrum in MHz 
Mean traffic demand increment 
(mtdincr.) 
Normally distributed (mean, std dev); 
Mean= capacity leased during previous lease duration, std dev = 1 
New mean traffic demand per 
MO (mtdnew) 
Value = mtdi + mtdincr. (feedback mechanism); 
Updated after every trade cycle for each MO 
 
Description of the assumptions presented in Table A-1: 
We have assumed a dense geographical region with an area of 1km
2
. The number of 
mobile operators is assumed to be three as it represents a typical scenario present in 
developed mobile markets. The assumptions regarding the number of sector sites per 
km
2
, bandwidth per MO and average spectral efficiency per MO has been adopted from 
Markendahl et al. (2011) as shown in Table A-2. 
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Table A-2 Assumptions for spectral efficiency and cell capacity adopted from Markendahl et al. 
(2011) 
 
The maximum user traffic which any MO can cater to has been assumed to be of 
100Mbps and total MO subscriber population of 5000 has been assumed for an area of 
1km
2 
which represents a dense urban region and this user population is assumed to be 
divided amongst the operator MO1, MO2, andMO3 with a market share of 40%, 34% 
and 26% respectively. As mentioned before, the mean traffic demand is exponentially 
distributed and its value for each of the MO has been calculated based on the 
assumption that the average data consumption per month of each subscriber is 8GB. 
Within the simulation toolkit that we have used (i.e. REPAST Symphony Relogo) the 
simulation time is represented in terms of ticks. We have assumed each tick to be 
equivalent to 1second (in real time) and thus for simulating a trading day, the simulation 
is run for 86400 ticks. The tradable entity in case of capacity trading markets (Wi-Fi 
and Super Wi-Fi) is measured in terms of Mbps and in case of spectrum leasing markets 
is measured in terms of MHz.  
In order to incorporate a feedback mechanism within the mean traffic demand of MOs, 
we introduce another variable „mtdincr‟ whose value is assumed to be normally 
distributed with its mean being equal to capacity leased during the previous lease 
duration. Accordingly the new value of „mtd‟ is determined as the sum of „mtdinitial‟ and 
„mtdincr‟. An important thing to note here is that the value of the mean traffic demand 
does not increase indefinitely for the MOs. We have introduced an upper threshold for 
each of the operator which determines how much the „mtd‟ can rise up to. The threshold 
value for each of the operator is given by: mtdmax MO1 = 250Mbps, mtdmax MO2 = 
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208Mbps, and mtdmax MO3 = 160Mbps. Then as a sensitivity analysis parameter we 
have the length of lease time varying according to the values as shown in the table A-1.  
Table A-3 Traffic model parameters of the operating environment (LAO) 
Parameter Description (value assumptions and comments) 
Wireless standard LAOWi-Fi = IEEE802.11b/g, LAOWi-Fi2.0 = IEEE802.11af 
Total # of access points (APs) Value = 900; 
Represents a typical scenario prevalent in dense urban area 
Configuration Value  = 10x90, 30x30, 90x10; 
Represented as (# of LAO)x (# of APs) 
Frequency band of operation LAOWi-Fi = ISM & LAOWi-Fi2.0 = TVWS; 
TVWS quantification ~ 22MHz in contiguous fashion and ~96MHz in 
non-contiguous fashion 
Spectral efficiency Value: LAOWi-Fi =2.7bps/Hz & LAOWi-Fi2.0 = 8.0bps/Hz  
Max capacity per LAO (Cmax) Values (in Mbps): LAOWi-Fi = 12.15(10x90),4.05(30x30),1.35(90x10) 
LAOWi-Fi2.0 = 60(10x90),20(30x30),6.67(90x10) 
Mean traffic demand per LAO 
(mtd) 
Mean value: @( 50% of Cmax) for each scenario 
Exponentially distributed and no feedback mechanism here 
 
Description of assumptions presented in Table A-3: 
Total number of APs are assumed to be 900 which represent a typical value prevalent in 
dense urban region with an area of 1 square kilometer. The value of spectral efficiency 
in case of LA operation within ISM band has been assumed to be 2.7bps/Hz. Since the 
standardization of Super Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11af) is still under process thus spectral 
efficiency for this scenario is not exactly known and we have assumed it to be 
approximately 8bps/Hz. According to our assumptions the spectral efficiency of LA 
operators is higher than that of WA operators. As observed from Figure A-1, spectral 
efficiency of WA operator is highest near the base station but it decreases exponentially 
as we move away from it towards the cell edges. Now if we consider inside locations 
where most of the data demand is likely to arise, spectral efficiency of WA operator is 
expected to be even lower as compared to that of LA operators and hence it validates 
the assumption made above. 
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Figure A-1 Decrease in spectral efficiency of cellular systems with increasing distance from base 
station as illustrated in Markendahl et al. (2011) 
Table A-4 Revenue and Cost model parameters of the operating environment 
Reveue Model for MO 
Parameter Description (value assumptions and comments) 
Revenue earned per Mb 
(rev/Mb) 
Offloading scenario 
(Supplier agent: LAOWi-Fi/LAOWi-
Fi2.0) 
Leasing TVWS spectrum scenario 
(Supplier agent:TVB) 
 0.00026 Euros/Mb 
no network cost required for MO 
0.00013 Euros/Mb 
network cost required for MO 
Cost Model for MO (in offloading scenario) 
Parameter Description (value assumptions and comments) 
Usage based leasing cost (lc) 
 
Supplier Agent: LAOWi-Fi  
0.00005 Euros/Mb 
Supplier Agent:LAOWi-Fi2.0 
0.000075 Euros/Mb 
Fixed leasing cost 
 
lease/allocation time 
(in sec.) 
Fixed cost 
(in Euros) 
  LAOWi-Fi LAOWi-Fi2.0 
 100 4 6 
 500 6 9 
 1000 8.4 12.6 
 2000 10.92 16.38 
 4000 13.1 19.66 
 8000 14.41 21.62 
 10000 15 22.50 
Brokerage cost (bc) @10% of the total leasing (fixed+usage based) cost 
(as Broker commision  for matching capacity demand and supply) 
 Transaction cost (tc) 
(cost per transaction) 
0.5 Euros/transaction 
In between SpecEx & MO 
0.5 Euros/transaction 
In between SpecEx & LAO 
 (to be paid to the Spetrum Exchange(SpecEx) for facilitating trade)  
Cost Model for MO (in leasing TVWS spectrum scenario) 
Limit Order price Calculated by each of the MO depending on their willingness to lease 
TVWS spectrum 
Transaction and auction cost Zero; in order to compare across different trading scenario 
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Description of assumptions presented in Table A-4: 
For a MO the prime revenue stream is through the services which it offers to its 
subscribers. We focus on the revenue from the mobile broadband services and measure 
it in terms of revenue earned per Mb (rev/Mb). The value (rev/Mb) assumed depends 
upon the scenario in consideration. For the offloading cases the CAPEX (capital 
expenditure) cost involved in producing a megabit of data is minimal as compared to 
the case of leasing exclusive spectrum band which requires high investments to be made 
in network infrastructure. Thus rev/Mb achieved in former case is higher as compared 
to the latter.  These values have been adopted from an analysis done by McKinsey 
(2010).  Following Figure A-2 (from the McKinsey (2010) report) projects the expected 
revenue and network costs to MOs for providing mobile broadband in future.  Using the 
values projected in Figure A-2 we have assumed revenue to be equivalent to 0.3 US 
cents per MB which amounts to 0.026 Euro cents per Mb. The network costs have been 
assumed as 0.15 US cents per MB which amounts to 0.013 Euro cents per Mb.  
 
Figure A-2 Expected revenue and network cost evaluation per MB of mobile broadband data for 
the MOs as illustrated in McKinsey (2010) 
We have assumed a variable cost structure incurred by the market participants. The 
various components of this cost structure are as followed:  
I. Usage based lease cost – This component represents the flow of money from the 
MOs to the LAOs in lieu of the capacity being provided by them through their 
network of APs deployed within the concerned geographical region. This cost 
has been assumed to be 0.0005 Euros/Mb in case of LAOWi-Fi and 0.00075/Mb 
in case of LAOWi-Fi2.0. The costs are higher because of better performance 
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expected from super Wi-Fi in terms of better range and penetration of signals. 
The LAOs in super Wi-Fi case further shares it with the TV broadcasters in lieu 
of their usage of TVWS. Hence a revenue sharing mechanism (on percentage 
basis) is implemented between LAOs and TVBs. 
II. Fixed lease cost – This cost component is again required to be paid by MOs to 
the LAOs depending upon the length of trading cycle (the values assumed are 
shown in the table). It is independent of the amount of mobile data consumed by 
the MO‟s subscriber over the LAO network.  This cost is for safe guarding the 
LAOs against a scenario where the MOs lease excess capacity from them and do 
not make use of it during a trade cycle. In such a case, if only usage based cost is 
involved then the LAOs would not be able to extract any economic value out of 
their unused excess capacity. The LAOs in super Wi-Fi case further shares it 
with the TV broadcasters in lieu of their usage of TVWS. Hence a revenue 
sharing mechanism (on percentage basis) is implemented between LAOs and 
TVBs. 
III. Brokerage cost – This cost component arises during the case when we are 
dealing with spectrum exchange based on brokerage facility and it represents the 
broker‟s commission of matching demand and supply. We have assumed this 
cost to be 10% of the total leasing cost (fixed plus the usage based component) 
and which is required to be paid by the MOs to the spectrum brokers. 
IV. Transaction cost – Since spectrum exchange provides all the facilities and a 
central place over which the trade can take place, thus it is required to be 
compensated as well. Thus we have incorporated a transaction cost which is 
incurred by MOs and the LAOs and is given to the spectrum exchange. This cost 
has been assumed to be 0.5 Euros/transaction.  
V. Auction cost – This cost component arises when we are dealing with spectrum 
exchange with auctioning facility (i.e. in Case3 – TVWS spectrum leasing 
markets) and is required to be paid by the MOs to the auctioneers present within 
the spectrum exchange. We have assumed this cost to be zero so as to bring a 
comparison in between different trading scenario. As shown through our 
evaluation results, Case3 performs poorly (in terms of MOs profits) compared to 
other trading scenario even though we assumed auction cost to be zero.  
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It is important to note that since there isn‟t enough empirical data which exist for ST 
markets, a number of assumptions were required to be made while deciding over the 
traffic model and revenue-cost model parameters. Thus all the simulation results are 
subject to variations in the assumptions which have been made and explained in this 
section for setting up the model.   
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Appendix B: Zero-Intelligence-Plus bidding strategy 
ZIP bidding strategy has been adopted for the auction process in TVWS spectrum 
leasing scenario. MOs and TVBs use this strategy for posting their bid and ask price 
respectively in the market after they have decided on their limit order price (L), i.e. 
maximum price a buyer is willing to pay and minimum price a seller is willing to sell 
during an auction. We have adopted the use of this strategy from the previous work 
done in Caicedo (2009) on the simulation of ST markets. According to Caicedo (2009), 
this strategy is not computationally intensive and can be used to implement software 
based traders (agents) which can have their performance similar to human traders.  
Here we discuss the fine details involved in the working of ZIP bidding strategy 
pertaining to our market model used in Case3. During any round of auctioning process 
trader agents (i.e. MOs and TVBs) are required to submit their bid/ask or the shout 
price. This shout price is dependent upon limit order price and the profit margin (μ) of 
trader agents. Profit margin determines the difference between the agent‟s limit price 
and the shout price. It varies in each auction round depending on the value of the last 
shout price and results of the previous auctioning process (i.e. whether the last shout 
resulted in a successful transaction or not).  
Process from the buyer agent (i.e. MOs): Based on their requirements for excess 
capacity MOs post their bids during each round of auction. Assuming that transaction 
happens, the MO which wins that auction round increases its profit margin for the next 
round while the remaining MOs decrease their profit margins in order to improve their 
chances of winning  the next round of auction. However in a case when no transaction 
happens, i.e. none of the MO‟s shout price is able to match with that of the shout price 
(ask) of TVBs, then all the MOs decrease their profit margins.   
Process from the supplier agent (i.e. TVBs): For every successful transaction during a 
round of auction, TVBs increases their profit margin and hence the shout price and just 
as in the case of buyer agent, if there is no transaction then TVBs decrease their profit 
margin.  
The profit margins are adjusted according to the following adaption mechanism: At a 
given time t, an individual ZIP trader calculates the shout price      with limit price   
and using the profit margin μ(t) according to the following equation: 
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According to ZIP strategy the value of μ for each trader must change dynamically 
(either increase or decrease) in order to make the trader‟s shout-price competitive when 
compared to shout price of other traders. This variation in profit margin is achieved 
through a machine learning rule - Widrow-Hoff “delta rule”. Based on this rule, an 
update for the profit margin μ on the transition from time t to t+1 is done according to 
following equations:  
        
            
 
    
Where: 
                           
                     
                     
Here in these equations      is the target price,   is the learning rate and   is the 
momentum coefficient.      and      are the random real and      is the last shout 
value. When it is required to increase the agent‟s shout price then      > 1.0 and      > 
0.0; however when it is required to decrease the shout price then 0.0 <      < 1.0 
and      <0.0. 
The values for all the above described variables have been adopted from the prior work 
done on ST markets in Caicedo (2009). Thus accordingly   is uniformly distributed 
over the range [1.0, 1.05] for price increase and within the range [0.95, 1.0] for price 
decrease.   is uniformly distributed over [0.0, 5.0] for price increase and [-5.0, 0] for 
price decrease.   is fixed at 0.3 and   has the value of 0.05. To start off the auctioning 
process initial profit margins , are randomly generated to be within 5% and 35% for 
MOs and TVBs. 
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Appendix C: Long-tail curves 
Here we present the figures obtained from the analysis of total volume of traffic carried 
through different operator (MO and LAO) network for remaining LAO configurations 
(30x30 and 90x10) which were not illustrated in the results chapter. As discussed before 
the figures have a long tail shape with MOs carrying the bulk amount of the traffic and 
forming the head, while the LAOs constituting towards the tail. Figure C-1 to Figure C-
4 illustrates how the shape evolves under different LAO configurations i.e. 30x30 and 
90x10. We also illustrate an expanded view of the tail part of the distribution for better 
clarity. 
Traffic carried within operator’s network 
(30x30) configuration
 
Figure C-1 Evolution of long tail shape of traffic volume from one trading case to other (30x30 
LAO configuration) 
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Expanded view of Tail
(30x30) configuration
 
Figure C-2 Expanded view of tail for 30x30 LAO configuration 
 
Traffic carried within operator’s network 
(90x10) configuration
 
Figure C-3 Evolution of long tail shape of traffic volume from one trading case to other (90x10 
LAO configuration) 
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Expanded view of Tail
(90x10) configuration
 
Figure C-4 Expanded view of tail for 90x10 LAO configuration 
 
